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Involuntary Cotenants: Eminent Domain and Energy 
and Communications Infrastructure Growth 
Andrew P. Morriss* 
Roy Brandys** 
Michael M. Barron*** 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal and state governments’ push for renewable electricity 
generation, rapidly expanding domestic natural gas and 
unconventional oil production, and the need to strengthen the United 
States’ energy and telecommunications infrastructure against both 
natural disasters and terrorist attacks mean that national networks of 
transmission lines, pipelines, and telecommunications lines will 
expand considerably over the next few decades. Much of the growth 
is likely to involve the use of eminent domain because utilities and 
governments often consider eminent domain to be a cheaper and 
easier alternative to negotiating with potentially resistant, unhappy 
landowners for the acquisition of property. Unfortunately, state 
eminent domain laws are inadequate for coping with this growth in 
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infrastructure, protecting landowners’ rights in the face of expanding 
utility easements, or giving utilities inappropriate price signals. 
Much attention in recent years has focused on the abuse of 
eminent domain by governments to benefit private interests by 
taking property rights under the guise of promoting economic 
development or addressing “blight,” particularly in the aftermath of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London.1 We 
argue that there is an equally important set of problems caused by 
inadequacies in state eminent domain laws. Specifically, the taking 
of easements for power lines, pipelines, and communications lines—
“large infrastructure easements” (LIEs)—essentially creates an 
involuntary cotenancy between the landowner (the owner of the 
servient estate) and the utility (the owner of the LIE) because of the 
increased burdens the easements place on servient estates relative to 
more traditional easements for rights of way or utility distribution 
lines.2 To a much greater extent than the property interests taken for 
roads, neighborhood distribution lines, or other more traditional 
takings, LIEs create an ongoing relationship between the easement 
holder and the landowner that is far more demanding than the 
relationship created when a fee estate is condemned. In these 
instances, “the devil is in the details” of the easement—and the 
easement is written exclusively by the utility taking the LIE without 
the participation of the landowner or review by a court or other 
neutral third party. Infrastructure easements generally pose serious 
governance problems. Public entities have serious incentive 
problems in maintaining often-hidden, capital-intensive projects, 
making “the problem of neglect . . . pervasive.”3 The grant of 
eminent domain power to utilities was itself a sign of the political 
power of a powerful interest group.4 Basing the only check on the 
exercise of that power on price is problematic for a number of 
                                                                                                             
 1. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Symbol or Substance? An Empirical 
Assessment of State Responses to Kelo, 17 S. CT. ECON. REV. 237 (2009); Ilya 
Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009); Ilya Somin & Jonathan H. Adler, The Green Costs 
of Kelo: Economic Development Takings and Environmental Protection, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 623 (2006). 
 2. “Infrastructure” is “the structural assets of the built environment and its 
physical support networks” and is characterized by “capital intensity, high 
public investment by all levels of government, and criticality to the economy.” 
NEIL S. GRIGG, INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE: THE BUSINESS OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 5, 7 (2010).  
 3. Id. at 10. 
 4. RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND 
RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 27 (1999).  
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reasons. This is particularly so today as utilities were given that 
power at a time when they were much more heavily regulated.5 
The absence of many of the protections the law uses to cope 
with the inevitable conflicts between those who share interests in 
the same property in LIEs created through eminent domain creates 
problems. For example, where multiple owners have voluntarily 
shared property ownership in a fee estate through one of the 
traditional forms of joint ownership—tenancy in common, joint 
tenancy with right of survivorship, or tenancy by the entirety—
property law generally fences off many of their dealings and leaves 
these issues to the co-owners to resolve through ex ante 
negotiations or to work out ex post. However, property law 
provides a crucial unilateral exit mechanism for these co-owners in 
the form of partition, which enables any owner to escape a 
relationship that has become dysfunctional, and to use the courts to 
equitably divide the property or the proceeds of a sale of the 
property. The shadow of these exit rights plays a key role in 
structuring the co-owners’ relationship.6 This enables Coasian 
bargaining in the creation and modification of easements. Since 
there are neither exit rights for landowners whose property is 
subject to a LIE nor well-developed legal principles for coping 
with conflicts between the LIE holder and the landowner, there is a 
problematic gap in the law that requires court intervention where a 
LIE is poorly defined ex ante.7 
                                                                                                             
 5. Id. at 27 (indicating that the “monopoly was only the most obvious 
benefit of regulation. Utilities also earned other special privileges, such as the 
right of eminent domain.”). 
 6. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES 
TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21 (1970) (noting that “the 
exit option is widely held to be uniquely powerful: by inflicting revenue losses 
on delinquent management, exit is expected to induce that ‘wonderful 
concentration of the mind’ akin to the one Samuel Johnson attributed to the 
prospect of being hanged.”). 
 7. Not surprisingly, many appellate opinions concerning disputes over 
easements end with a remand to the trial court for further proceedings to flesh 
out the exact parameters of the easement once the appellate court has settled the 
relevant legal principles governing the relationship. See, e.g., Graves v. Gerber, 
302 N.W.2d 717 (Neb. 1981). Graves concerned two neighbors with abutting 
driveways. Graves’s house included an exterior step extending into his 
driveway, which required vehicles to veer for a short distance onto Gerber’s 
driveway while passing the step in order to reach Graves’s garage. The parties’ 
predecessors in interest had created an easement permitting this, which stated, “a 
right of way over that portion of their property to the party of the second part, 
for said purposes of moving vehicles to and from the garage on the property of 
the party of the second part.” Id. at 719. Graves and Gerber’s relationship 
deteriorated – including disputes over whether Graves shoveled snow onto 
Gerber’s driveway in clearing the easement, parking by one on the property of 
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Landowners, whose property is taken by a utility for a LIE, are 
at a significant disadvantage under eminent domain law with 
respect to structuring their relationship compared to the other 
categories of landowners who are compelled to provide easements 
to others involuntarily. In some circumstances, courts can create 
easements by implication or necessity.8 When courts create such 
easements, they have broad equitable powers to shape the terms of 
the easement to minimize the harms to the burdened landowner 
while addressing the needs of the easement owner. The court 
proceeding serves as a substitute for the bargaining process, with a 
neutral decision-maker making the final determination of the terms 
of the easement.  
Because easements generally pose long-term governance 
problems for the dominant and servient interest owners, when an 
easement is created in a voluntary transaction, the parties have 
incentives to address those problems and the means to do so. The 
incentive stems from the easement’s impact on the value of the 
properties involved. A well-crafted easement will increase the net 
value of the combined properties more than a poorly crafted one. 
The negotiations between the parties over the terms provide one 
means to ensure easements are well crafted; the law governing 
easements provides another. Because there are generally no 
negotiations over the creation of a LIE through eminent domain 
other than over price, getting the background legal principles right 
is particularly important in coping with LIEs. Unfortunately, both 
eminent domain law and easement law fall short in this regard.  
                                                                                                             
 
the other, noise from air conditioning units, and other matters – and Gerber 
erected a fence along the property line which prevented this and required Graves 
to have difficulties in getting to his driveway. Id. at 720. The appeals court held 
that  
The easement must be limited to the use as established in practice. 
Graves’ vehicles must enter on his own driveway and remain there until 
it is necessary to drive onto the Gerber drive to safely pass the 
obstructions. The vehicles must then return to the Graves drive. This 
same path should also be followed in making exit to the street. The 
owners of the dominant tenement in removing snow from their own 
drive and from the portion of the drive subject to the easement shall 
pile none of it on the servient tenement. The servient tenement shall not 
be used for the parking of vehicles by the owners of the dominant 
tenement or their visitors.  
Id. at 720–21. It also remanded the case for the trial court to “view the premises 
to determine whether the removal of the fence south of the gap is required by the 
established use.” Id. at 721. 
 8. 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §§34.07–34.10 (Michael Allen Wolf, ed., 
2013); See 2 GEORGE W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF 
REAL PROPERTY §330, 95 (1980). 
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The existing academic literature on expanding LIEs is almost 
entirely written by proponents of renewable energy whose main 
concern is making eminent domain use easier rather than the fair 
treatment of landowners.9 There has thus been almost no attention 
paid to the day-to-day governance problems created by forcibly 
imposing LIEs on tens of thousands of landowners across the 
United States. 
Currently, state eminent domain laws give sole discretion to the 
utility in drafting the easement. Accordingly, neither negotiation 
nor exit is available to landowners when a utility invokes eminent 
domain to take a LIE. Not only are landowners unable to structure 
the relationship with the safeguards servient estate owners might 
include in an easement created through negotiation (because 
landowners faced with eminent domain proceedings have little 
bargaining power and the utility can generally be compelled to 
adjust only the price term), but the landowners are also denied the 
safeguard of judicial crafting of the easement terms applicable in 
cases of other compulsory easements. Not surprisingly, the 
landowner is typically not only in an involuntary relationship with 
the utility, but is often in an openly adversarial one. Further, 
landowners are generally at a significant bargaining disadvantage, 
as utilities are large firms with considerable political clout.10 
                                                                                                             
 9. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C.L. 
REV. 1079, 1086 (2013) (“eminent domain authority for transmission lines has 
always been, and will likely remain, a key legal tool to facilitate the 
development of such lines”). In addition, several commentators have argued that 
states build too few transmission lines because they undervalue the national 
benefits of the lines. Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate 
Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 
VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1803–04 (2012) (“in light of the current regulatory regime, 
which consists of small, highly devolved decisionmaking infrastructures, there 
are significant obstacles associated with creating large-scale systems that span 
many jurisdictions. Some of these challenges include (1) transmission siting and 
permitting structures that exist primarily at the state level; (2) lack of robust 
federal authority or regional coordinating authority to plan and site transmission 
infrastructure when states fail to approve projects as a result of citizen 
opposition, politics, or cost; and (3) difficulty in determining which electricity 
users should pay for new transmission lines, particularly where those lines need 
to be built in states with significant wind resources, small populations, and low 
electricity demand.”); Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power 
Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1048 (2009) (“State 
transmission siting statutes do not provide an adequate legal mechanism to 
ensure the consideration of regional benefits and, to the extent in-state benefits 
predominate as the driving factor for siting decisions, will stand as a significant 
barrier to planning and constructing new high-voltage transmission facilities to 
transport power from renewable sources.”). 
 10. RICHARD MUNSON, FROM EDISON TO ENRON: THE BUSINESS OF POWER 
AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY 3 (2005) (noting that 
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“Giant utilities employ some of the most effective lobbyists, 
working on many fronts to maintain their monopolistic benefits,” 
and spent over $21 million in federal campaign contributions in 
2002.11 The result is that infrastructure projects create a set of 
relationships between landowners and utilities that require repeated 
interactions on a wide range of issues, but deny the landowners the 
key tools the law provides in analogous situations that ensure the 
bargains reached are welfare enhancing, rather than mere wealth 
transfers from landowners to utilities that accompany the creation 
of LIEs. 
We argue that eminent domain laws need to be reformed to 
address these problems. The simplest reform is to eliminate 
eminent domain from LIEs entirely, forcing utilities to negotiate 
easement terms in arm’s length transactions and leveling the 
playing field between the utilities and landowners. Because the 
burdened landowners are a dispersed and unorganized interest 
group, while utilities have considerable political clout, this may be 
unobtainable through the political process in many states. 
Similarly, the even more potent “bootleggers and Baptists” 
coalition of utilities and environmental pressure groups, which 
back expansion of transmission lines for renewable energy, if not 
natural gas or oil pipelines, mobilize powerful interests behind 
maintaining the power. Therefore, we also suggest reforms that 
ameliorate some of the more significant problems without 
eliminating utilities’ use of eminent domain entirely. For example, 
providing courts (and other third parties with roles in eminent 
domain proceedings) with the opportunity to alter the easement 
terms proposed by utilities for LIEs would serve as an important 
step toward solving many of the problems we describe. In addition, 
states and the federal government can take further steps to improve 
the LIE acquisition process by gathering and disseminating market 
data to, and providing greater statutory guidance for, valuation 
decisions. Part I sets out the basics of the coming expansion of the 
United States’ energy and telecommunications grids and the 
resulting increase in the use of eminent domain. Part II compares 
the property law framework utilized in other contexts for dealing 
with easements and cotenants with how current eminent domain 
                                                                                                             
 
electric utilities have assets of over $600 billion and annual sales over $260 
billion and are the largest industry in the United States). 
 11. Id. at 4. The utility industry was involved in political corruption from its 
start: “Early competition in the electricity industry . . . involved bribing aldermen 
for the permits needed to string wires across or under city streets.” Id. at 22. 
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law treats these problems. Part III proposes a series of legislative 
solutions to remedy the problems identified. 
I. THE GROWING PROBLEM OF LARGE INFRASTRUCTURE EASEMENTS 
America’s energy and telecommunications infrastructure will 
increase in coming decades. A critical part of this expansion will 
be the acquisition of easements for electric transmission lines, 
pipelines, and other infrastructure by electric, gas, and 
telecommunications utilities. Note that LIEs can be distinguished 
in several key ways from smaller-scale infrastructure easements 
(SSIEs) such as electric distribution, telecommunications lines, or 
gas pipelines from a central distribution point to individual homes 
or businesses, the so-called “last mile” of the networks, which we 
discuss below. 
This expansion of LIEs will occur for several reasons. First, 
federal and many state governments are promoting growth in 
renewable electricity production, primarily from wind and solar 
energy, through subsidies and mandates.12 The best locations for 
                                                                                                             
 12. See Lincoln L. Davies, Tracing U.S. Renewable Energy Policy, 43 
ENVTL L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10320, 10325–27 (2013) (describing federal 
renewable policy as a “wide array of legal and regulatory measures, almost too 
many to document” and noting that 37 states and the District of Columbia have 
renewable portfolio standards requiring their utilities to include renewables, up 
from one state in 1993); Sanya Carleyolsen, Tangled in the Wires: An 
Assessment of the Existing U.S. Renewable Energy Legal Framework, 46 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 759, 771–76 (2006). Some energy sector entrepreneurs argue for 
less reliance on the grid. For example, Thomas Casten has argued in favor of 
expanding the use of on-site generators as a means of increasing reliability and 
competition. 
On-site generators, according to Casten, offer enormous advantages. 
First, they reduce the need for unpopular transmission lines. “Remove 
the ban on private wires that bypass distribution monopolies and the 
result will be fewer wires,” he says. “If industry met all future load 
growth with on-site power, the U.S. would not need any new 
transmission lines.” 
MUNSON, supra note 10, at 136. Similarly, Schewe’s history of the grid notes 
that increasing use of cogeneration and smaller plants is leading to some 
reduction in long distance transport of electricity. PHILLIP F. SCHEWE, THE 
GRID: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE HEART OF OUR ELECTRIFIED WORLD 198 
(2007) (“Why not just build more lines? Because they’re expensive to construct,  
politically painful to plan (‘Not in my backyard’), tricky to finance (in a volatile 
business with huge price swings), and difficult to regulate (conflicting state and 
federal statutes).”). Because distribution lines lose 10-20% of the power 
transmitted over them, a large scale grid requires more generation capacity than 
a smaller scale one. Resolving such issues is beyond the scope of our paper, but 
the issue highlights the interdependence of energy policy decisions and suggests 
36 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. 3 
 
 
 
generating such power are often far from centers of electricity 
consumption.13 In addition, technical considerations often require 
network expansion to effectively add new power sources to 
existing grid infrastructure, including many miles of new high 
voltage lines.14 The existing transmission infrastructure “is a 
rickety antique . . . . Today’s high-voltage transmission lines were 
designed before planners ever imagined that enormous amounts of 
electricity would be sold across state lines, and, consequently, the 
wires are often overloaded and subject to blackouts.”15 Reliability 
                                                                                                             
 
that the scale of LIEs necessary will depend in part on how other issues are 
resolved. Id. 
 13. Vaughn Nelson, Wind Power, in ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION, 
TRANSMISSION, AND DISTRIBUTION I-1, 1-1 (Leonard L. Grigsby ed., 3d ed. 
2012) (“In general, windy areas are distant from load centers, which means that 
transmission is a problem for large-scale installation of wind farms.”); Ken 
Zweibel, et al., Solar Grand Plan, 298 SCI. AMER. 1, 1 (2007) (“To convert the 
country to solar power, huge tracts of land would have to be covered with 
photovoltaic panels and solar heating troughs. A direct-current (DC) 
transmission backbone would also have to be erected to send that energy 
efficiently across the nation.”); Math H.J. Bollen & Fainan Hassan, 
INTEGRATION OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION IN THE POWER SYSTEM 86–87 
(2011) (noting tendency of new power sources to be located away from 
consuming areas). The Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) also 
added to this trend by authorizing the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) to mandate interconnection of independent power producers to the grid. 
Hirsch describes how utilities failed to anticipate FERC’s aggressive use of this 
authority. HIRSH, supra note 4, at 89–117. The 1992 Energy Policy Act 
furthered this trend. Id. at 243–44. 
 14. See Matthew Slavin & Jason J. Zeller, No Grid, No Gain: Untangling the 
Transmission Tie-Up, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (Apr. 15, 2011) http://www 
.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2011/04/no-grid-no-gain-untangling-
the-transmission-tie-up, archived at http://perma.cc/KQ9Z-B34Q (“[O]ne primary 
hurdle facing renewable developers stems from limitations to the existing 
transmission grid. Simply put, efforts to integrate renewable generation into the 
U.S. energy mix have frequently been stymied by the lack of available 
transmission facilities.”); MUNSON, supra note 10, at 138 (“Most utilities” respond 
to reliability problems “by trying to construct more centralized power plants, more 
transmission and distribution lines, and perhaps banks of batteries.”). High voltage 
transmission lines are more efficient than low voltage lines because increasing the 
voltage allows reductions in the current for the same amount of power (as Power = 
Voltage x Current) and because transport losses are a function of the square of 
current. STEVEN W. BLUME, ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM BASICS FOR THE 
NONELECTRICAL PROFESSIONAL 48–49 (2007). 
 15. MUNSON, supra note 10, at 4. See also DAVID E. NYE, WHEN THE 
LIGHTS WENT OUT: A HISTORY OF BLACKOUTS IN AMERICA 31 (2010) (“In 1960 
it [the grid] was the most advanced machine of its kind, and half of its 
components were less than 10 years old. But by 2005 the grid was a patchwork 
of old and new elements that badly needed an overhaul.”); F. MICHAEL 
MALOOF, A NATION FORESAKEN: EMP: THE ESCALATING THREAT OF AN 
2014] INVOLUNTARY COTENANTS 37 
 
 
 
becomes increasingly important as the network expands because 
failures affect more people.16 Efforts to boost competition amongst 
utilities can also lead to increased demand for LIEs.17 For example, 
the federal Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorized the use of 
eminent domain for “national interest electric transmission 
corridors.”18 
Second, market forces are also driving changes to energy 
infrastructure. Fracking has unleashed a natural gas revolution.19 
                                                                                                             
 
AMERICAN CATASTROPHE 25 (2013) (“[T]he grid is effectively maxed . . . It is 
far less able to compensate for any potential difficulties than in the past.”); 
SCHEWE, supra note 12, at 244 (“One of the most urgent problems is crowdedness 
in long-distance interstate power transmission. Everyone recognizes that there 
isn’t enough superhighway to send all the power that needs sending, at least not 
enough if you want to have some standby emergency-carrying ability…”); NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON ENHANCING THE ROBUSTNESS AND RESILIENCE 
OF FUTURE ELEC. TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.S. TO TERRORIST 
ATTACK, TERRORISM AND THE ELECTRIC POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM 30 (2013) 
[hereinafter NRC, TERRORISM] (“The transmission system is much more stressed, 
and thus more vulnerable than it was a few decades ago.”). Technological change 
may also reduce the need for an expanded grid by increasing the capacity of the 
existing transmission network.  
 16. NYE, supra note 15, at 27 (“As electricity wove networks together, 
power failures became less and less tolerable, because they shut down the entire 
infrastructure.”). 
 17. Id. at 156 (citing a utility executive for the proposition that “insufficient 
transmission [capacity] had protected local power markets, inhibited 
competition, restricted customer choice, and threatened the reliability of the 
system.”); Id. at 158 (explaining lack of investment in transmission capacity 
leading up to deregulation of electric utilities). 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 824 (2005). See also Debbie Swanstrom & Meredith M. 
Jolivert, DOE Transmission Corridor Designations & FERC Backstop Siting 
Authority: Has the Energy Policy Act of 2005 Succeeded in Stimulating the 
Development of New Transmission Facilities? 30 ENERGY L. J. 415, 452–54 
(2009) (describing process). 
 19. ROBERT W. KOLB, THE NATURAL GAS REVOLUTION: AT THE PIVOT OF 
THE WORLD’S ENERGY FUTURE 64 (2014) (noting that after declining and static 
natural gas reserves from 1970 to 2000, reserves have grown by 90% in a 
decade). Pipeline construction was “the key step” in making use of natural gas 
during the twentieth century. STEPHEN G. BREYER & PAUL W. MACAVOY, 
ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 64 (1974). 
Deregulation of natural gas sales played an important role in launching this 
revolution. Under the pre-deregulation regime, “Wellhead price controls 
discouraged exploration and gradually cut down the gas reserves available for 
interstate sale by pipelines to customers. As Stephen Breyer and Paul MacAvoy 
pointed out, the failure to develop new reserves early in the 1960s was already 
curtailing production by the end of the decade.” CHRISTOPHER J. CASTANEDA & 
CLARANCE M. SMITH, GAS PIPELINES AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICA’S 
REGULATORY STATE: A HISTORY OF PANHANDLE EASTERN CORPORATION, 
1928-1993 184 (1996). See also BREYER & MACAVOY, at 64 (“The [Federal 
38 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. 3 
 
 
 
Not only has this led to greater use of natural gas to generate 
electricity and industrial uses, but expanding the network of natural 
gas pipelines into areas with weak gas infrastructure (e.g., New 
England) will allow industrial and residential users to shift off of 
fuel oil.20 Just a few years ago, the United States worried that it 
was running out of natural gas.21 In response, liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) terminals were built to allow the import of natural gas.22 
Some of these terminals are now being converted to export 
facilities, and new export facilities are also being planned.23 
Moreover, cheap natural gas is encouraging the conversion of fleet 
vehicles to burn LNG and compressed natural gas (CNG).24 In 
addition, states such as California offer incentives to individuals to 
use CNG personal vehicles.25 These trends will require increasing 
                                                                                                             
 
Power C]ommission’s start-up effort, from the 1940s to the 1960s, centered on 
constraining transport prices for service and thus profits of the pipeline 
companies.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Tux Turkel, Maine Poised for Historic Transition to Natural Gas, 
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Sept. 29, 2013), http://www.pressherald.com/2013 
/05/25/maine-poised-for-historic-transition-to-natural-gas-2013-05-26/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6A9K-QWAF?type=image; Lori Valigra, Will Natural Gas Alleviate 
Maine’s Energy Woes?, MAINE’S BUS. NEWS SOURCE, (Sept. 2, 2013), 
http://www.mainebiz.biz/article/20130902/CURRENTEDITION/308299998/will-
natural-gas-alleviate-maine’s-energy-woes, archived at http://perma.cc/FT4L-5Z4V; 
John Kemp, Connecticut Contemplates Connecting More to Gas: Kemp, REUTERS, 
(Oct. 19, 2012, 8:50 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/19/us-column-
kemp-connecticut-gas-idUSBRE89I0PT20121019, archived at http://perma.cc 
/DLH9-W93K; Oil-fired boiler users converting to natural gas, PLANT 
ENGINEERING (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.plantengineering.com/single-article/oil-
fired-boiler-users-converting-to-natural-gas/82e47ea9b74df17d60328adee24b241b 
.html, archived at http://perma.cc/B2XN-2578; Jason Notte, Demand Grows in N.E. 
for Natural Gas Heat, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 25, 2012, at B7; SCHEWE, supra note 
12, at 194–95 (describing growth in demand for natural gas for electric generation).  
 21. See, e.g., Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Why U.S. Is Running Out 
of Gas, TIME (July 13, 2003), http://content.time.com/time/magazine 
/article/0,9171,464406,00.html (quoting Federal Reserve chair Alan Greenspan 
that “We are not apt to return to earlier periods of relative abundance and low 
prices [for natural gas] anytime soon.”).  
 22. KOLB, supra note 19, at 79; MICHAEL D. TUSIANI & GORDON SHEARER, 
LNG: A NONTECHNICAL GUIDE 33–36 (2007). 
 23. KOLB, supra note 19, at 88–89. The complete absence of discussion of 
U.S. exports in Tusiani and Shearer’s 2007 guide is a testament to the rapidity of 
the change caused by the fracking revolution. 
 24. Id. at 91. 
 25. See Compressed Natural Gas (CNG), CAL. AIR RES. BD., 
http://www.driveclean.ca.gov/Search_and_Explore/Technologies_and_Fuel_Type
s/Compressed_Natural_Gas.php, archived at http://perma.cc/PGP-8UBR (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2014) (“There are typically some very enticing incentives for 
these vehicles. For instance, they are still eligible for HOV stickers.”). 
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pipeline capacity to ensure that sufficient supplies are available at a 
network of refueling stations.26 
Further, the discovery of vast quantities of unconventional oil 
reserves in remote areas has created a need for expansion of the 
crude oil and refined product pipeline networks.27 The Keystone 
XL pipeline is a dramatic example of this demand for pipeline 
expansion, but many more miles of other pipelines will be needed 
to bring these reserves to refineries.28 The demand for expansion of 
                                                                                                             
 26. See Natural Gas Pipeline and Storage Infrastructure Projections 
Through 2030, ICF INT’L 3 (Oct. 20, 2009), http://www.ingaa.org/File.aspx?id 
=10509, archived at http://perma.cc/XA6B-G8HG (predicting need for 28,900 to 
61,900 miles of natural gas pipeline by 2030 in U.S. and Canada); Rodney 
White, CNG Startups target end-users far from pipelines, NG ADVANTAGE 
(Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.ngadvantage.com/news/in-the-news/cng-startups-
target-end-users-far-pipelines, archived at http://perma.cc/MSB7-V2GB 
(describing challenges of delivering natural gas to customers not connected to 
pipelines). The growth of natural gas is also causing expanded investment in 
fueling facilities for the trucking market. Peter Kelly-Detwiler, Acceleration of 
the Natural Gas Highway, FORBES (Nov. 11, 2012, 11:36 AM), http://www 
.forbes.com/sites/peterdetwiler/2012/11/13/acceleration-of-the-natural-gas-
highway/, archived at http://perma.cc/F5TH-4RTS; Jim Polson, GE, Chesapeake 
to Develop Natural Gas Infrastructure, BLOOMBERG, (Mar. 7, 2012, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-07/ge-chesapeake-to-develop- 
natural-gas-car-fueling-service-in-u-s-.html, archived at http://perma.cc/G6Z-
D9Z3; Rebecca Smith, Natural Gas Filling Stations: Few and Far Between, 
WALL ST. J., May 23, 2012, at B2; Michelle Jarboe McFee, TravelCenters firms 
up Shell deal for natural gas fueling stops across the United States, PLAIN 
DEALER (Apr. 16, 2013, 4:41 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/business 
/index.ssf/2013/04/travelcenters_firms_up_shell_d.html, archived at http://per 
ma.cc/G7YH-27T9. The development of a national network of natural gas 
pipelines is a comparatively recent development. As recently as 1930, there was 
only a fragmentary pipeline network, with most gas needs met via synthetic gas 
plants that converted coal into coal gas. CASTENADA & SMITH, supra note 19, at 
19. By 1934, the network had expanded dramatically so that almost 40% of gas 
crossed state lines in pipelines. Id. at 71. 
 27. See Kristen Hays, Oil Pipeline Crunch Shifts U.S. Shale Race from 
Drillbits to Valves, REUTERS (July 30, 2012, 4:44 AM), http://www.reuters 
.com/article/2012/07/30/us-oil-usa-pipelines-idUSBRE86T02820120730, 
archived at http://perma.cc/KD6Z-UFHC; Patrick McGeever, Crude Oil Pipeline 
Build Out More Than Just Keystone XL, AAM THOUGHT LEADERSHIP (2012), 
http://www.aamcompany.com/wp-content/uploads/AAM-Thought-Leadership- 
Crude-Oil-Build-Out-More-Than-Just-Keystone-XL-11.28.12.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/ZE5J-YFCY.  
 28. Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Pipelines are Safest for Transportation of Oil 
and Gas, Manhattan Institute Issue Brief No. 23 (June 2013), (noting that 
“[r]ising oil and natural gas production is outpacing the transportation capacity 
of our inadequate national pipeline infrastructure.”). The existing network of 
long distance pipelines dates only to the 1930s and really expanded during 
World War II. JOHN L. KENNEDY, OIL AND GAS PIPELINE FUNDAMENTALS 3 
(1984). 
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the pipeline network is also driven by concerns that the current 
system of rail and truck transportation is both more dangerous and 
more costly than pipelines.29 
Similarly, demand for communications bandwidth continues to 
grow, requiring continuing expansion of the telecommunications 
network. Forecasts of Internet traffic now refer to the “zettabyte 
era,” with a zettabyte being one billion terabytes.30 The market for 
fiber optic cables and connectors is forecast to grow by 50% 
annually until 2017, although technological advances are also 
increasing existing networks’ capacity.31 
Third, existing energy and telecommunications networks are 
fragile and require infrastructure investment to protect them 
against a variety of threats.32 The August 14, 2003 blackout in the 
                                                                                                             
 29. Furchtgott-Roth, supra note 28 (indicating that “pipeline transportation 
is safer than transportation by road, rail, or barge, as measured by incidents, 
injuries, and fatalities—even though more road and rail incidents go 
unreported.”); Edward McAllister, Train Carrying Crude Oil Derails, Cars 
Ablaze in Alabama, REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2013, 6:32 PM), http://www.reuters 
.com/article/2013/11/08/us-crude-train-explosion-idUSBRE9A70Q920131108, 
archived at http://perma.cc/TA6C-EF2X (describing derailment of train carrying 
N.D. oil to Alabama); Canadian Hamlet Evacuated after Oil Train Crash 
Causes Huge Blaze,  TH E GU AR D IAN (Oct .  19 2013,  12:09 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/19/canada-rail-fire-derailment,  
archived at http://perma.cc/56WK-ECZA (describing derailment of train carrying 
crude oil and liquefied petroleum gas from Edmonton to Vancouver); Quebec oil 
train disaster: 24 bodies recovered so far, THE GUARDIAN (July 12, 2013, 12:22 
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/12/quebec-oil-train-crash-disas 
ter-24-bodies, archived at http://perma.cc/8GDD-NETT (describing oil train 
derailment that killed fifty). 
 30. The Zettabyte Era, CISCO (June 10, 2014), http://www.cisco.com 
/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns341/ns525/ns537/ns705/ns827/VNI_Hyperconnect
ivity_WP.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3GC4-ZE6J (forecasting that “[i]n 
2016, global IP traffic will reach 1.1 zettabytes per year or 91.3 exabytes per 
month, and by 2018, global IP traffic will reach 1.6 zettabytes per year or 131.9 
exabytes per month” while “IP traffic in North America will reach 40.5 exabytes 
per month by 2018”).  
 31. Valerie C. Coffey, Forecast for Fiber Optics; Strong Growth through 
2017, OPTICS & PHOTONICS NEWS (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.osa-opn.org 
/home/industry/2013/august/forecasts_for_fiber_optics_strong_growth _through 
_2/?feed=Industry#.VCtzeyldUh0, archived at http://perma.cc/3HGC-BZLG; 
Anton Troianovski, Optical Delusion? Fiber Booms Again, Despite Bust, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 4, 2012, at A1.  
 32. See John G. Kappenman, Geomagnetic Disturbances and Impacts upon 
Power System Operation, in ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION III-1, 17–1 
(“Recent analysis carried out for the EMP Commission, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), and the U.S. 
National Academy of Sciences has determined that severe geomagnetic storms 
(i.e., space weather caused by solar activity) has the potential to cause crippling 
and long-duration damage to the North American electric power grid or any 
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Northeast—caused by a constellation of problems occurring at the 
same time—revealed significant weaknesses in the power grid.33 
Since September 11, 2001, there has also been increased concern 
over the vulnerability of the United States’ electrical and 
telecommunications grid to terrorists.34  
For such reasons, the coming decades are likely to see an 
expansion of LIEs as utilities attempt to cope with the demands of 
renewable energy sources, new sources of natural gas and 
                                                                                                             
 
exposed power grid through the world. The primary impact to the power grid is 
the risk of widespread permanent damage to high-voltage transformers and other 
power delivery and production assets, which are key, scarce, and difficult to 
replace, of the high-voltage power network.”); MALOOF, supra note 15, at 35 
(“The entire petroleum and natural gas delivery system relies on SCADA 
[supervisory control and data acquisition systems] and is thus susceptible to 
dangerous malfunctions that could lead to massive fires and explosions as a 
result of an EMP event.”). As Kappenman notes, the problem is severe because 
the footprint of a space weather event can “extend across a continent.” 
Kappenman, supra note 32, at 17–2. Our current national grid magnifies the 
problem by serving as a potential “large antenna to these storms.” Id. at 17-3. 
Since these events are “inherently instantaneous”, there is little time to react to 
them when they occur. Id. In the March 13, 1989 Quebec blackout, the grid went 
from normal operation to province-wide blackout in 92 seconds as the result of 
seven near-simultaneous equipment failures. Id. As Kappenman explains, as our 
power transmission network: 
[H]as grown in size, it has also grown in complexity and sets in place a 
compounding of risks that are posed to the power grid infrastructures 
for GIC [geomagnetically induced current] events. Some of the more 
important changes in technology base that can increase impacts from 
GIC events include higher design voltages, changes in transformer 
design, and other related apparatus. The operating levels of high-
voltage networks have increased from the 100-200kV thresholds of the 
1950s to 400-765kV levels of present-day networks. With this increase 
in operating voltages, the average per unit length circuit resistance has 
decreased while the average length of the grid circuit increases. In 
addition, power grids are designed to be tightly inter-connected 
networks, which present a complex circuit that is continental in size. 
These interrelated design factors have acted to substantially increase 
the levels of GIC that are possible in modern power networks. 
Id. at 17-13. 
 33. Blackout 2003: How Did It Happen and Why? Hearing Before the 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce of the H.R., 108th Cong. 1 (2010); NYE, supra 
note 15, at 161 (attributing 2003 blackout to “an under-regulated utility system 
relying on outmoded monitoring equipment and inadequate transmission lines to 
meet rising demand.”); MUNSON, supra note 10, at 147 (“The traditional power 
industry’s knee-jerk reaction to the 2003 blackout was: ‘Expand the grid.’”). 
 34. NRC, TERRORISM, supra note 15; GRIGG, supra note 2, at 307–08; NYE, 
supra note 15, at 180–199; MALOOF, supra note 15, at 108 (noting that much of 
the U.S. military’s domestic operations rely on civilian energy and 
telecommunications grids). 
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petroleum, increasing demand for telecommunications bandwidth, 
and the need to protect existing networks against natural disasters 
and terrorists. Utilities with the power of eminent domain are 
likely to use the eminent domain power because eminent domain 
provides them with significant advantages in terms of cost and 
easement language.35  
LIEs present unique problems for the legal system. They are 
distinguishable from SSIEs in three important ways. First, SSIEs 
provide benefits to the servient estate (e.g., electrical service, 
phone and cable lines, natural gas service), while LIEs typically 
provide no direct benefits to the servient estate.36 Second, SSIEs 
generally require less intrusion onto the servient estate for 
inspection and maintenance. For example, a typical utility 
distribution line runs along a property border and is accessible 
from the adjacent street or alley. Other than tree trimming in the 
easement, utilities and property owners rarely have any interaction, 
much less conflicts, in contrast to the industrial-sized use and 
maintenance needs of LIEs. Third, SSIEs involve infrastructure on 
                                                                                                             
 35. These advantages are well-documented in the literature on the abuse of 
eminent domain for economic development projects. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, 
Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development 
Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005, 1021 
(2004) (“[E]conomic development takings are especially vulnerable” to rent-
seeking.). Just as in the economic development context, eminent domain allows 
utilities to acquire property rights at a lower cost than market transactions 
would. 
 36. This appears to factor into courts’ analyses of disputes over SSIEs. In a 
dispute over the addition of cable television lines to existing utility easements, 
the Missouri Court of Appeals found for the cable company, finding that:  
The unsurprising fact that the drafters of the 1922 easements did not 
envision cable television does not mandate the narrow interpretation of 
the purposes of the conveyance of rights and privileges urged by 
plaintiffs. The expressed intention of the predecessors of plaintiff 
trustees was to obtain for the homeowners in the subdivision the 
benefits of electric power and telephonic communications. Scientific 
and technological progress over the ensuing years have added an 
unforeseen dimension to such contemplated benefits, the transmission 
by electric impulse of visual and audio communication over coaxial 
cable. It is an inescapable conclusion that the intention of plaintiffs’ 
predecessors was the acquisition and continued maintenance of 
available means of bringing electrical power and communication into 
the homes of the subdivision. Clearly, it is in the public interest to use 
the facilities already installed for the purpose of carrying out this 
intention to provide the most economically feasible and least 
environmentally damaging vehicle for installing cable systems.  
Henley v. Cont’l Cablevision of St. Louis Cnty., Inc., 692 S.W.2d 825, 829 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1985). Moreover, the extension of utilities into existing neighborhoods 
provided landowners with a “highly attractive and increasingly affordable” 
service. SCHEWE, supra note 12, at 71. 
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a much smaller scale, reducing the potential for conflict between 
the servient estate holder and the utility.37 Finally, SSIEs are often 
an integral part of the development of a tract and are welcomed by 
landowners desiring the services the SSIE brings.  
LIEs are, as the name suggests, large. The United States natural 
gas pipeline network is 278,000 miles long;38 the oil trunk line 
network is 55,000 miles long with another 95,000 miles of refined 
product pipelines;39 the electrical transmission network has more 
than 200,000 miles of high voltage lines,40 and the fiber optic cable 
network is extensive and likely to grow.41 Their terms therefore 
affect tens of thousands of landowners across the country, and a 
single project requiring LIEs may stretch across multiple 
jurisdictional boundaries. Further, LIEs are critical to the integrity 
of our nation’s infrastructure. Modern society depends on reliable 
telecommunications and energy delivery. The chaos that followed 
the 2003 blackout in the Midwest and Northeast, which was 
partially due to the network’s lack of redundancy following a 
small-scale outage in Ohio, illustrates this.42  
                                                                                                             
 37. Growing criticism of utility infrastructure from environmental pressure 
groups from the 1960s onward has made expansions of LIEs controversial. 
“Blocking [the] Storm King [pumped hydroelectric storage facility in New York 
in the 1960s] was seen by some as a pivotal step in the evolution of the 
environmental movement. The critics who had found their voice and the 
appropriate method for standing up to the giant corporation would hereafter be a 
regular part of the culture of electricity, whether it concerned the siting of 
transmission lines, the release of sulfur into the sky from a smokestack, the 
killing of fish by heated water returning to a river from a power plant, or the 
falling of coal particles into lungs and onto property.” SCHEWE, supra note 12, at 
161. 
 38. Natural Gas Pipelines, PIPELINES 101 (Sept. 16, 2014, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.pipeline101.com/overview/natgas-pl.html, archived at http://per 
ma.cc/D7WH-FZS3. See also Annual Report Mileage Summary Statistics, DEP’T 
OF TRANSP. & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, http://phmsa.dot.gov/portal/site 
/ P H M S A / m e n u i t e m . 7 c 3 7 1 7 8 5 a 6 3 9  f 2 e 5 5 c f 2 0 3 1 0 5 0 2 4 8 a 0 c 
/?vgnextoid=3b6c03347e4d8210VgnVCM1000001ecb7898RCRD&vgnextchann
el=3b6c03347e4d8210VgnVCM1000001ecb7898RCRD&vgnextfmt=print, 
archived at http://perma.cc/T6WJ-7QYJ (last visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Transmission, EDISON ELEC. INST., http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy 
/transmission/Pages/default.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/7TNH-YWZ4 (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2014).  
 41. See National Broadband Plan Executive Summary, FCC xiv-xv (2010), 
http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan-executive- 
summary.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/P2WR-9L83 (describing goals of 
expanding broadband access).  
 42. MUNSON, supra note 10, at 126–128 (noting that “[t]he 2003 blackout 
demonstrated the grid’s complexity . . . and vulnerability.”). Id. at 128. 
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Faced with important readjustments of legal rights among 
numerous property owners brought on by the influx of LIEs, the 
legal system should respond with innovative ways to better protect 
landowners while allowing creation of needed infrastructure. 
Eminent domain laws are outdated and fail to recognize that LIEs 
result in a continuing relationship between the utility and the 
landowner akin to an imposed cotenancy. Therefore, the current 
system provides neither appropriate opportunities for input into the 
terms of the LIEs from landowners nor adequate compensation for 
their losses when utilities have the power of eminent domain and 
can avoid negotiating with landowners. The good news is that 
these problems are relatively straightforward and can be fixed 
using traditional legal measures.  
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Large-scale infrastructure of the type involved in a typical LIE 
creates a relationship between the LIE-holder and the servient 
estate owner that is different from the relationship between 
property owners in other easements. This section discusses the 
types of demands this infrastructure makes on the property owners, 
which fits poorly within the current approach to eminent domain 
and easements. 
A. Easement & non-easement eminent domain  
In many eminent domain cases,43 the public entity acquires full 
(fee) title to land needed for the project. This is often justified as 
necessary to avoid holdout problems: if Texas wishes to build a 
road from Lubbock to Austin, its engineers determine where the 
optimal road location is (subject to political input), and the state 
then forces property owners along the route to sell the state 
sufficient land to construct the road.44 If the parties cannot agree on 
                                                                                                             
 43. Infrastructure takings are those done to build utility transmission lines 
and similar structures. We therefore exclude Kelo-type takings from the 
definition of infrastructure takings (although the property taken in that case was 
“mysteriously” for “park support”). See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 
469, 495 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). There is a problem with eminent 
domain abuse in Kelo-type circumstances (although opinions differ about the 
extent), but it is a conceptually different problem since the paradigmatic Kelo-
type taking is simply redistributing property from A to B. A’s complaint is not 
that A is forced into a continuing relationship with B but that A has lost her 
property to B. 
 44. Of course, there might be political issues involved in the road’s location 
as well. However, we set those aside here. 
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the price, the law provides a procedure to determine “fair” 
compensation.45 Proponents of eminent domain authority contend 
that if the state had to negotiate with each landowner along the 
route, bilateral monopoly problems would exist in which each 
landowner would attempt to appropriate the surplus created by the 
project by holding out to be the final seller.46 Critics have argued 
that this overstates the problem: there are generally alternative 
locations for much infrastructure that would enable public 
authorities to avoid holdout problems,47 and spillover benefits of 
many infrastructure projects cause many landowners to welcome 
routing across their land.48 Nonetheless, the key is that once title to 
the land for the road is taken by the state and the state’s check to 
the landowner clears, there are almost no issues about which the 
state and landowner continue to interact that are different from the 
state’s interaction with any other property owner. In other words, 
the former owner of the site of a road or school taken by eminent 
domain does not retain a connection with the property that was 
taken.  
Conversely, in a LIE, the utility and landowner have an 
ongoing relationship. The LIE significantly constrains the 
landowner’s use of the servient estate. Range management is 
significantly impacted by the presence of a LIE in ways that inhibit 
the landowner from using standard methods of weed and brush 
control. This is a serious problem. For example, Florida estimates 
that weeds in pastures and rangeland generally cost its ranchers 
                                                                                                             
 45. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 21.014–21.018 (2013). 
 46. See, e.g., Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517, 530–31 
(2009) (“Strategic behavior poses the central barrier to successful negotiations 
overcome by eminent domain. Such behavior includes the closely related 
problems of holdouts, bilateral monopoly, and asymmetric information.”). 
 47. Bruce L. Benson, The Mythology of Holdout as Justification for Eminent 
Domain and the Public Provision of Roads, 10 INDEPENDENT REV. 165, 170–71 
(2005). See also John A. Lovett, A Bend in the Road: Easement Relocation and 
Pliability in the New Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, 38 CONN. L. 
REV. 1, 15–16 (2005) (describing problems with allowing substitution of takings 
(as liability rules) for negotiated transactions (as property rules) in easement 
relocation cases). 
 48. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the 
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 
1223 (1967) (suggesting that the compensation requirement be relaxed “when 
there are visible reciprocities of burden and benefit, or when burdens similar to 
that for which compensation is denied are concomitantly imposed on many other 
people (indicating that settlement costs are high and that those sustaining the 
burden are probably incurring relatively small net losses--else, being many, they 
probably could have been mobilized to deflect the measure which burdens 
them).”).  
46 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. 3 
 
 
 
more than $180 million annually.49 Across the nation, noxious 
weeds cost ranchers more than all other pests combined.50 The 
impacts include: 
[I]nterfering with grazing practices, lowering yield and 
quality of forage, increasing costs of managing and 
producing livestock, slowing animal weight gain, reducing 
the quality of meat, milk, wool, and hides, and poisoning 
livestock. In addition, infestations can reduce recreational 
land values and the spiny species can cause human health 
problems.51  
Also, “weed infestations can reduce plant diversity, threaten rare 
and endangered species, reduce wildlife habitat and forage, alter 
fire frequency, increase erosion, and deplete soil moisture and 
nutrient levels.”52  
The presence of a LIE restricts ranchers’ ability to engage in 
weed control through controlled burns, an important and widely 
used technique.53 Moreover, as the utility regularly brings 
equipment onto the LIE for purposes of inspection and service, 
ranchers are dependent on the utility’s compliance with 
                                                                                                             
 49. B. A. Sellers & J.A. Ferrell, Weed Management in Pastures and 
Rangeland – 2014, UNIV. OF FLA. AGRONOMY DEP’T UF/IFAS EXTENSION 1 
(Jan. 2014), http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/WG/WG00600.pdf, archived at http: 
//perma.cc/CTC8-WPV2. 
 50. Joseph M. Ditomaso, Invasive Weeds in Rangeland: Species, Impacts, 
and Management, 48 WEED SCI. 255, 257 (2000). The federal government has 
designated 112 noxious weeds and state governments have designated many more, 
see Federal Noxious Weeds, USDA NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., 
http://plants.usda.gov/java/noxious?rptType=Federal, archived at http://perma.cc 
/WU3G-EZ5M (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). For a typical best practices example, 
see Best Management Practices for Controlling the Spread of Noxious Weeds, 
GREATER YELLOWSTONE COORDINATING COMM. - TERRESTRIAL INVASIVE SPECIES 
SUBCOMM. (2011), http://www.weedcenter.org/mrwc/docs/GYCC_final%20ER 
.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DRM3-QN2X. 
 51. Ditomaso, supra note 50, at 257. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Larry D. White & C. Wayne Hanselka, Prescribed Range Burning 
in Texas, TEX. A&M UNIV. (2000), http://www.tpwd.state.tx.us/publications 
/pwdpubs/media/pwd_bk_w7000_0196.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HB3W-
LYD7 (last visited Sept. 30, 2014); Lorie Woodward Cantu, Controlled Burn: 
Focus Group Helps County Leaders Understand Controlled Burns, THE 
CATTLEMAN (Feb. 2011), http://thecattlemanmagazine.com/archives/2011/02 
/controlled-burn-Feb2011.html, archived at http://perma.cc/77B6-Y9PE (noting 
that “[c]ontrolled burning can: help control unwanted plants such as Ashe 
juniper and eastern red cedar; rearrange plant structure for wildlife; improve 
forage quality for animals; encourage nutrient recycling; increase carbon 
sequestration in the long term because of improved plant community vigor and 
health”).  
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burdensome weed control measures concerning vehicles. To see 
how burdensome these measures are, consider that the Department 
of Defense and the USDA require the use of commercial wash 
units for vehicles going off-road on different federal sites.54 This 
raises the question: If this is how government agencies treat their 
own land, why are private landowners unable to insist on similar 
comprehensive protection? Where utility crews work across broad 
territories, the potential for spreading noxious weeds and other 
contaminants is large.55 Note that these problems would not arise 
where, as a result of an agreement between neighbors, a rangeland 
parcel was burdened by an easement allowing a neighboring parcel 
access to a road. Not only would the neighbors be able to negotiate 
issues relating to range management in establishing the easement, 
but their interests would be in relative harmony; both would be 
interested in controlling invasive weed species to protect their 
properties. By contrast, the utility owning the LIE has little interest 
in controlling invasive species, except those that threaten their 
lines (kudzu in the Southeastern United States being a prominent 
example).56 
Moreover, LIEs have a significant impact on the long-term 
development potential of the burdened property. Consider a parcel 
                                                                                                             
 54. See Kimberley Taylor, et al., Washing Vehicles to Prevent Weed Seed 
Dispersal, MONT. STATE UNIV. EXTENSION SERV. GUIDE (July 2011), 
http://msuextension.org/publications/AgandNaturalResources/MT201106AG.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/WC2K-D2BZ. This is not a trivial undertaking. The 
Montana Extension Service describes the process as follows: 
Commercial vehicle wash units typically clean mud and debris from 
vehicles using undercarriage washers and high-pressure hand sprayers. 
The wash water is then subjected to an extended filtration and settling 
process, aimed at removing waste (sediment and other large particles) 
from the water so that it can either be reused for future washes or 
discarded.  
Id. 
 55. Id. (“[O]nce seeds become attached to a vehicle, they can travel for 
hundreds of miles under dry conditions before falling off . . . ”).  
 56. See William Atkinson, Taming the Vines, AM. PUBLIC POWER ASSOC. 
(June 2011), http://www.publicpower.org/Media/magazine/ArticleDetail.cfm 
?ItemNumber=32120, archived at http://perma.cc/V5YH-SAZK (describing 
problems caused by kudzu and some other invasive species for electric utilities). 
See also Jim Green, et al., Transmission Line Construction and Maintenance, in 
ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION 12-1, 12-20 
(Leonard L. Grigsby ed., 3d ed. 2012) (describing regulatory requirements for 
vegetation management). Even if the utility cares about an invasive species like 
kudzu, its crews may not and so there is a serious principal-agent issue even for 
the subset of invasive species that might have an impact on the utility’s use of 
the easement. Morriss’ in-laws’ and their neighbors’ experience with LCRA’s 
failure to remove metal trash from the easement (which the utility promised to 
do) across their property illustrastes this principal-agent problem. 
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of unimproved farmland or rangeland. Its current use yields a 
revenue stream from its agricultural production and possible 
recreational uses (e.g., hunting leases). But it may also have future 
potential to be subdivided into smaller parcels suitable for vacation 
homes. In the western portion of the Texas hill country, for 
example, an 80-acre parcel can support a cow-calf pair annually, 
but it could also serve as a recreational site suitable for a residence. 
Once a LIE is established, the recreational use is either no longer 
available or has been reduced in value. The impact may appear in 
both price reduction and increased marketing time. Thus, the 
landowner has sustained the real loss of potentially converting a 
portion of the property to recreational use. Since LIEs often 
parallel roads, they are often imposed on the portions of the 
property most easily converted to recreational uses. This represents 
a significant loss for the rancher or farmer. This is not just a 
pricing issue, because management of the LIE affects the 
development potential of the remainder of the parcel. In a 
voluntary creation of a LIE, the terms of the LIE would be 
structured to maximize the joint surplus. When a utility can 
unilaterally impose terms, it is unlikely to value the joint surplus 
unless the development loss can be quantified at the time of the 
taking.  
There are multiple dimensions in which the utility owning a 
LIE can negatively affect the value of property. The location of a 
LIE across a parcel can have a significant impact on its future 
development potential: an easement along one border is quite 
different from an easement through the center of a property.57 The 
use of different utility structures—monopoles rather than lattice 
towers, for example—affects the aesthetics of the LIE; 
consequently, the value of the property for recreational and other 
uses is affected.58 The utility’s management practices also have an 
impact. For example, utilities often clear-cut the entire easement. 
In one specific case, this resulted in the loss of over 1,000 live oak 
                                                                                                             
 57. See, e.g., Arkansas Valley Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Brinks, 400 S.W.2d 278 
(Ark. 1966) (discussing dispute over location of easement within property). 
 58. George C. Karady, Environmental Impact of Transmission Lines, in 
ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, AND DISTRIBUTION 20-1, 20-3 
(Leonard L. Grigsby ed., 3rd ed. 2012) [hereinafter Karady, Environmental/Impact] 
(describing monopoles as “less disturbing and aesthetically more pleasing”). 
Monopoles can be used for non-extra high voltage lines. George G. Karady, 
Concept of Energy Transmission and Distribution, in ELECTRIC POWER 
GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, AND DISTRIBUTION 9-1, 9-6 (Leonard L. Grigsby 
ed., 3d ed. 2012). 
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trees greater than two inches in diameter on the three miles of 120-
foot wide clear-cut easement across the property.59 
When the parties negotiate the terms of the LIE, the landowner 
can seek accommodations that mitigate these impacts, and the 
utility can offer different price-term combinations to landowners 
with different preferences. Under eminent domain systems that 
give the utility the unilateral right to determine the terms of the 
easement and leave only the price term for third-party resolution, 
this bargaining process does not occur. 
State eminent domain laws largely date to the mid-twentieth 
century.60 Despite a recent flurry of reforms aimed at stopping 
Kelo-type abuses, the basic structure of the statutes remain 
unchanged by those reforms, which were largely aimed at 
removing or curbing eminent domain powers to take “blighted” 
properties or to promote economic development.61 For “normal” 
takings, our review of state statutes shows that 41 states62 provide 
for a jury trial on damages, 29 allow ‘quick takes’ in at least some 
circumstances before a court-supervised finding of damages is 
reached, 25 require the taker to negotiate with the landowner, 23 
relatively frequently shift litigation costs (including attorney’s 
fees) for other than abandoned or invalidated takings,63 18 require 
use of a commission or other body before a trial on damages, and 
14 require the taker to procure appraisals before negotiating or, if 
requested by the landowner, before filing a condemnation petition. 
In general, there was a wave of eminent domain reforms starting in 
the 1970s that added or restored jury trial rights and added cost 
shifting provisions to state statutes. Together with the post-Kelo 
reforms after 2005, the 1970s reforms were the last time there were 
major changes to eminent domain law outside of individual states. 
However, much has changed with respect to LIEs since the 1940s 
and 1970s.64 Not only have networks vastly expanded, but public 
                                                                                                             
 59. Based on tree count done by Carol Akers in the case involving 
Morriss’s inlaws’ property. 
 60. We had a research assistant compile a table of changes to state eminent 
domain laws from World War II to the present. The discussion in this paragraph 
is based on his work. 
 61. Andrew P. Morriss, Symbol or Substance? An Empirical Assessment of 
State Responses to Kelo, 17 S. CT. ECON. REV. 237, 246 (2009). 
 62. We include the District of Columbia in the list of states. 
 63. State statutes are all over the map on this issue, so others might classify 
the statutes slightly differently. We are confident that any observer would put 
the range between 20 and 30. 
 64. Technical progress in the 1940s and 1950s “allowed higher voltages of 
electricity to be transmitted over longer distances.” MUNSON, supra note 10, at 
77. In addition, “the system of utility regulation [before deregulation] 
encouraged expansion. Because a power company’s profits rose with the size of 
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attitudes toward energy and telecommunications infrastructure 
have changed. As population outside cities has expanded, valuation 
of land unmarred by infrastructure has increased.65 
In short, we contend that there is a significant difference 
between a fee taking and an easement acquisition. The first 
requires little interaction between utilities and property owners 
after the take, while the latter mandates an ongoing relationship 
between the two property owners who share ownership of the fee 
simple bundle of rights to the tract of land under the LIE. One 
example of how this difference plays out in practice comes from 
the controversy over railroad land acquisition and later shifts in use 
of abandoned rail networks.66 Where railroads acquired the rights-
of-way through voluntary transactions, “most railroad corridors 
held a wide variety of . . . interests, corresponding to the wishes 
and desires of individual landowners.”67 “[I]n most land disputes 
between the railroads and the original landowners” before the 
1880s (the period when there was great enthusiasm for expanding 
rail networks), “the railroads won because either the land granted 
was found to be in fee simple absolute, or the railroads’ exclusivity 
needs required a strong property interest. As public enthusiasm for 
the railroads waned, however, so did judicial deference.”68 Over 
time,  
[C]ourts began to interpret the original granting documents 
strictly and narrowly. If the railroad was still operating, it 
would be deemed to hold only the smallest property right 
possible consistent with its operational needs. If it had 
                                                                                                             
 
its investments, more power plants and transmission lines translated into larger 
returns.” Id. at 79. See also Andrew P. Morriss, Implications of Second-Best 
Theory for Administrative and Regulatory Law: A Case Study of Public Utility 
Regulation, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 135, 149–56 (1998) (discussing rate of return 
regulation).  
 65. MUNSON, supra note 10, at 87–88 (noting rise of protests over 
transmission lines in 1970s); NYE, supra note 15, at 159 (noting the same). 
 66. See Danaya C. Wright & Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles: 
Rails-to-Trails, Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements 
from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Centuries, 27 ECOLOGY L. Q. 351, 377 
(2000) (“Some states . . . limited the types of property interests the railroads 
could acquire through adverse possession or condemnation.”). See also Darwin 
P. Roberts, The Legal History of Federally Granted Railroad Rights-of-Way and 
the Myth of Congress’s “1871 Shift,” 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 85, 148–49 (2011). 
 67. Wright & Hester, supra note 66, at 378. Railroads also acquired land 
through adverse possession. Id. at 378–79. In a number of instances, records of 
acquisition were lost. Id. at 379. Some states restricted the interests railroads 
could acquire through adverse possession or by eminent domain. Id. at 379–80.  
 68. Id. at 378. 
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abandoned its line, courts often found that the grant had 
conveyed a mere easement that was extinguished by 
abandonment.69  
The continuing controversy over the shift of use of railroad rights-
of-way to recreational trails is further evidence of the problems 
that arise with changed uses.70 
We now turn to an examination of how the law regulates 
conflicts among property owners and how this framework operates 
in the context of LIEs. 
B. Legal frameworks for conflicts among property owners  
In many instances, property owners’ rights may be limited 
because of conflicts between neighbors over incompatible uses. As 
Professor Casner observes:  
The occupancy of neighboring tracts of land by different 
individuals gives rise to probable conflicts of interests 
between them. The interest of each, where such a conflict 
exists, must be reasonably limited in order that the interest 
of the other shall have reasonable play. In the mutual 
accommodation that thus takes place each may suffer a 
curtailment of the protection which would otherwise be 
given to him. One may find that his interest in the use of 
water on his premises may be limited so as to protect the 
interest of his neighbor in the flow of water to his premises. 
One may be limited in his freedom of excavation on his 
premises in the protection of a desire or a possible desire by 
his neighbor to build upon or otherwise improve his 
premises. One may be prohibited from conducting himself 
                                                                                                             
 69. Id. at 378–79. 
 70. See, e.g., Andrea C. Ferster, Rails-to-Trails Conversions: A Review of 
the Legal Issues, 58 PLANNING & ENVTL. L. 3 (2006) (outlining legal issues); 
Cecilia Fex, The Elements of Liability in a Trails Act Taking: A Guide to the 
Analysis, 38 ECOLOGY L. Q. 673 (2011) (noting the same legal issues); Preseault 
v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1 (1990) (upholding Congressional 
power to require “railbanking” of abandoned lines); Preseault v. United States, 
100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (plurality holding such efforts a taking under the 
Fifth Amendment). But see Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 853 F.2d 
145 (2d. Cir. 1988) aff’d 494 U.S. 1 (1990) (holding no taking). See also 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251 (2012) (National Trails System Act). Another significant 
set of disputes over the terms of these land grants focused on whether they 
included mineral rights. Thomas E. Root, Railroad Land Grants From Canals to 
Transcontinentals, ABA Section of Natural Resources Law Monograph Series 
No. 4, 37 - 42 (1987). 
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in such a way as to interfere with the normal sleeping 
habits of his neighbor. 
 
Such mutual accommodations are commonly looked upon 
as a normal incident of the protection of occupancy of land 
in a crowded community. They are implicit in general 
statements respecting the rights of possessors. They arise 
out of the mere fact of impinging possessions. They do not 
depend upon anything exceptional in the relationship of the 
neighboring possessors. That two persons are neighbors is 
sufficient to produce a qualification of the freedom of each 
in the interest of the other.71 
Where neighbors are unable to resolve such disputes through 
negotiation, the law of nuisance serves as a check on conflicting 
uses.72 Nuisance case law may be an “impenetrable jungle,”73 but it 
serves the function of enabling courts to resolve conflicts the 
parties are unable to resolve through negotiation. 
Easements and their close relatives, real covenants and 
equitable servitudes—all of which the Restatement of Property 
(Third) now lumps into the single category of “servitudes”—are 
important tools for adjusting neighbors’ relations through 
voluntary transactions. In particular, servitudes resolve a problem 
that mere contracts cannot; they enable the embedding of a 
contractual solution between neighbors into the legal interest in the 
land itself, ensuring that the agreement will continue to bind the 
parties’ successors.74 Landowners voluntarily agree to impose 
                                                                                                             
 71. II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 228 (A. James Casner et al., eds., 1st ed., vol. 
II 1952) [hereinafter II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY]. 
 72. See ROBERT G. NATELSON, MODERN LAW OF DEEDS TO REAL 
PROPERTY § 13.4, at 350 (1992) (“One response to the unique nature of land is 
the law of nuisance.”). 
 73. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 571 (1971). But 
see Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Nuisance Law, RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 326 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith, 
eds. 2011) (arguing that nuisance is “a coherent body of rules that serves an 
explainable function.”). 
 74. As Prof. Robert Natelson observes:  
The law of running covenants permits the original covenantee and 
covenantor to craft provisions mutually agreeable to them and tailored 
to the relative situations of their parcels. These covenants are recorded, 
providing prospective purchasers of dominant and servient estates with 
more precise notice of their obligations than that afforded by the law of 
nuisance . . . Thus, the doctrine of covenants running with the land is 
designed to address the heavy and unique losses that neighboring uses 
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servitudes on their land when doing so creates value. Thus, in 
general, a servitude on Blackacre for the benefit of Whiteacre must 
increase the value of Whiteacre by more than it diminishes the 
value of Blackacre. If it does not, the owner of Blackacre will not 
agree to it since the owner of Whiteacre will not be able to 
compensate him sufficiently.75 
Thus, when private property owner “A” creates an easement 
across Blackacre (or another interest in it, such as a real covenant) 
to benefit Whiteacre, the reason is usually that the combined value 
of the parcels is enhanced by more than the transaction costs of 
creating the easement or other interest.76 Often, A owns both 
parcels involved at the time the servitude is created, and A’s 
motivation is to enhance the combined property values. Suppose A 
owns Blackacre, which is bounded by roads to the east and west 
and by other properties to the north and south. If A subdivided 
Blackacre into two new parcels along a north-south dividing line, 
the western parcel’s value might be enhanced by an easement 
offering access to the road along the eastern parcel’s eastern 
edge.77 In creating the easement, A would be mindful of both the 
increase in value to the western parcel from the access and the 
decrease in value to the eastern parcel caused by providing the 
easement. Thus A would locate the easement to find the 
combination that minimizes the harm to the value of the eastern 
parcel yet maximizes the value added to the western parcel.  
If at a later date, when the eastern parcel has been transferred to 
B and the western parcel to C, B and C found themselves in a 
conflict over the easement, the law provides means for adjusting the 
relationship. However, such conflicts would only arise after the 
easement’s creation. Such conflicts might arise when the easement’s 
terms are less than a complete contingent contract or when 
                                                                                                             
 
can impose on a dominant owner while preserving relative freedom of 
contract for the servient owner. 
NATELSON, supra note 72, § 13.4, at 350–51. See also II AMERICAN LAW OF 
PROPERTY, supra note 71, § 8.4, at 231 (“When created, [an easement] modifies 
what would otherwise be the normal right of this possessor. If he is subject to 
the burden of the easement, his possessory rights are less as against the owner of 
the easement than they otherwise would be.”). 
 75. This follows from the basic law and economics analysis of contracts and 
seems so obvious to us as to not require a citation. 
 76. Private property owner A might be motivated by benevolence toward 
the owner of Whiteacre (as where Whiteacre is a property owned by a family 
member), but we doubt that is likely to occur with LIEs with any frequency. 
 77. If one parcel was landlocked, the law would generally imply an 
easement for access. In this hypothetical, neither parcel is landlocked but access 
to one road is preferable. 
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circumstances change to cause a problem not addressed by the 
original easement’s terms. The latter would require an adjustment of 
the terms. For example, many early railroad easements’ terms have 
proven troublesome in the conversion of old rail right-of-ways into 
bike trails.78  
When the easement is created by agreement, the parties 
negotiate the terms to address issues related to their sharing of the 
portion of the servient tenement covered by the easement. In such 
cases, it is not surprising that “courts stress the primary control 
exercised by the language of the creating conveyance.”79 Courts 
have been generally unwilling to allow servient estate or easement 
owners to escape the consequences of their choices, forcing them to 
rely on negotiations to change previously-negotiated easement 
terms that one or the other no longer finds convenient.80 Easements 
                                                                                                             
 78. See Wright & Hester, supra note 66, at 378–79. 
 79. 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 8, at 34-133. (Michael Allen 
Wolf, ed., 2013) § 34.12 at 34–133. This is reinforced by what one court termed 
the “fundamental principles of the law with regard to easements.” Stefanoni v. 
Duncan, 923 A.2d 737, 745 (Conn. 2007). As the court in that case noted, “In 
determining the character and extent of an easement created by deed, the 
ordinary import of the language will be accepted as indicative of the intention of 
the parties, unless there is something in the situation of the property or the 
surrounding circumstances that calls for a different interpretation . . . . The use 
of an easement must be reasonable and as little burdensome to the servient estate 
as the nature of the easement and the purpose will permit.” (internal quotations 
and citations omitted). Id. at 745. 
 80. See, e.g., Tarr v. Watkins, 4 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1960) (noting the court’s 
refusal to allow a servient estate holder to move an easement providing access to 
adjacent parcel merely because the location prevented construction of a home on 
the property. The court stated the legal rule was “[o]nce the location of an 
easement has been finally established, whether by express terms of the grant or 
by use and acquiescence, it cannot be substantially changed without the consent 
of both parties . . . . And the grantor has no right either to hinder the grantee in 
his use of the way or to compel him to accept another location, even though a 
new location may be just as convenient.”). Id. at 365. Similarly, in Merrill v. 
Mfrs. Light & Heat Co., 185 A.2d 573 (Pa. 1962), the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court refused to allow the owner of mineral rights beneath a pipeline easement 
to force the pipeline to be removed to permit strip mining where the terms of the 
easement provided only that the servient estate holder was not liable for the 
removal of surface support beneath the pipeline. Focusing on the language of the 
easement (such as the use of the term “thereunder” rather than “thereupon” to 
describe the obligation with respect to surface support), the common usage of 
terminology (finding that “[t]he phrase ‘surface support’ is no esoteric word of 
art known only to the mining engineer, but it is a term generally understood by 
anyone familiar with the coal-mining regions of this Commonwealth”), the 
custom of the industry, and the agreement as a whole, the court concluded that 
the documents referred only to deep mining subsidence and not strip mining and 
so the servient estate owner could not demand removal of the easement owner’s 
pipeline. In cases where the creator of the easement fails to reserve rights it later 
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may also be created through prescription, implication, or 
necessity.81 In these instances, the terms of the easement are 
subjected to important checks, as the court creating the easement 
must approve its terms.  
LIEs created using eminent domain differ from virtually all 
non-LIE easements in this respect: eminent domain LIEs are 
created on terms established only by the utility, as current eminent 
domain law gives the taker the unilateral power to set the terms of 
the easement without review by a court or other body. Of course, 
to the extent that such terms can be valued, the servient estate 
holder may claim compensation for them through the eminent 
domain process. However, as discussed below, many of these are 
difficult to value, so pushing the issue into the valuation context is 
problematic. 
When easements are negotiated, the parties to the agreement 
can address potential conflicts ex ante and create solutions to 
potential problems in advance. For example, where an oil company 
sought to lay pipelines through marshy land, the contract between 
the oil company and the servient estate owner provided that if 
servient estate holder notified the oil company in writing of a 
breach of the terms of the easement, the easement would terminate 
if the breach were not corrected within sixty days.82 Further, if the 
easement was terminated, the oil company would have to remove 
its pipelines and replace the dams the contract required it to 
construct within 90 days.83 Finally, the contract provided for 
liquidated damages of $100/day for failure to comply with either of 
the above provisions, interest on the liquidated damages from the 
date of termination and payment of any court costs and reasonable 
attorney’s fees (“of not less than $5,000”) necessary for securing 
compliance.84 The agreement also specified where dredging 
                                                                                                             
 
wishes it had kept, courts have been unwilling to expand easements to 
accommodate the easement holder. For example, where a utility objected to the 
servient owner’s use of land under its power lines for a restaurant parking lot, 
the California appeals court found no restriction in the terms of the easement 
that would prevent such a use. As a result, the court concluded “We see no 
reason why this court should make a gift to plaintiffs of valuable rights in real 
property which they did not reserve in their original deed to defendants’ 
predecessors in interest.” City of Los Angeles v. Howard, 53 Cal.Rptr. 274, 280 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1966). 
 81. See II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 71, § 8.3 at 230, § 8.32 
at 256. 
 82. Pembroke v. Gulf Oil Corp., 454 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 83. Id. at 608–09. 
 84. Id. at 609. 
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material would be placed.85 When the oil company failed to 
comply with the agreement by allowing subsidence of the canal 
banks to widen the canal, the servient estate holder sued to enforce 
the conditions and won.86 
These provisions were well-crafted responses to problems 
anticipated by the parties. As the court noted in finding for the 
servient estate holder, the land was marshy terrain which “was 
unstable to the extent that for each foot dredged vertically there 
would eventually be lateral subsidence of each bank so as to 
increase the width at a rate of 2.75 to 3 feet for each foot of vertical 
depth dredged.”87 As a result, the court concluded that the oil 
company “knew full well that the banks of the canal would slide 
into the water” and broaden the canal beyond the permissible scope 
of the easement unless the oil company “sloped” the banks.88 
However, the court found that “for its own purposes and knowing 
full well the probable result, [the oil company] chose to attempt to 
dredge and excavate . . . without the required slope.”89 The parties 
had thus constructed an enforceable incentive system, including 
liquidated damages and termination provisions, with which to 
govern their relationship that addressed a specific problem 
anticipated by the servient estate owner. Not every easement 
involves such well-thought-out mechanisms for crafting appropriate 
incentives for the parties, and if they do not, it is a result of the 
parties’ choices about the amount of resources to invest in crafting 
the terms of their easements.90 
By contrast, in a LIE created through eminent domain, the 
utility can unilaterally dictate the terms. A LIE provides no 
opportunity for the servient estate holder (who likely has the best 
knowledge about both physical and financial conditions) to 
negotiate for incentives that will induce the utility to conduct its 
operations on the easement in a way that minimizes the harm to the 
servient estate or to negotiate liquidated damages or termination to 
govern breaches. 
Moreover, when an easement is created by negotiation, the 
servient estate holder may retain more of the “bundle of sticks” of 
                                                                                                             
 85. Id. at 609 n.2. 
 86. Id. at 613. 
 87. Id. at 610. 
 88. Pembroke, 454 F.2d at 611. 
 89. Id. 
 90. This can also be determined based on the parties’ actions. 2 THOMPSON, 
supra note 8, §332 at 112 (noting that “[w]here the terms of the instrument 
granting an easement are vague or indefinite, the easement may be construed in 
accordance with the uniform acts of the parties in using and enduring it for many 
years and so evidencing their intent”). 
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property rights than is possible when another dictates the easement 
terms. For example, a landowner and a town negotiated an 
easement allowing the town sewer board to cross the landowner’s 
property to reach its sewer plant and to construct a pipeline from 
the plant to the plant’s lagoon system. When the board attempted 
to grant a right to use the easement to another landowner to allow 
him to reach his property,91 the servient estate holder objected, and 
the court agreed, that the sewer board lacked the authority to 
enlarge its easement by allowing the neighbor to make use of it. 
This fact situation is likely to arise with respect to many LIEs 
involving transmission towers. A utility can expand its use of a 
LIE to incorporate additional lines or other utilities’ lines (e.g., 
adding a telecommunications cable to an electrical transmission 
tower).92 The ability to increase the height of towers, the number 
of towers, or the width of the arms on electrical towers are all 
powers that utilities regularly include in LIEs created through 
eminent domain. Valuing a hypothetical future expansion in an 
eminent domain can be challenging, yet all of these factors have a 
major impact on the amount of damage to the servient estate. 
Allowing the utility to unilaterally set the terms of the easement to 
include expansion allocates more of the benefit of the bargain, 
between the buyer and seller of the easement, to the buyer by 
preventing the seller from capturing a portion of the value of 
                                                                                                             
 91. See Phillips v. Water Works & Sewer Bd. of the Town of Ariton, 27 
So.3d 1206, 1207 (Ala. 2009). See also Capital Elec. Power Ass’n v. Hinson, 84 
So.2d 409, 462 (Miss. 1956) (finding that utility could not expand easement for 
power distribution line to serve an adjacent property once it had fixed location 
of easement by building original line, holding “that where there is a grant of a 
right of way easement which is in general terms as to location, length, or 
terminal points, and is therefore uncertain and ambiguous, it should be 
interpreted by reference to all attendant circumstances, including the purposes 
contemplated by the parties at the time of the execution of the grant; and the 
extent of the servitude is determined by ascertaining what is necessary to 
accomplish the purpose contemplated by the parties when the grant is made, as 
to which consideration should be given to the practice interpretation put upon 
the grant by the acts of the parties in the use of the grant”). 
 92. Oncor Electric Delivery Company, LLC typically includes the following 
language in its easements allowing it to install infrastructure: 
[T]o excavate, grade, remove obstructions, construct, maintain, and 
operate electric power and communication lines, each consisting of 
variable number of wires and cables, and all necessary or desirable 
appurtenances including supporting structures, foundations, guy wires, 
and guy anchorages over, under, across, and upon the Easement 
Property.  
See infra app. 3. 
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additional lines.93 Particularly where eminent domain 
compensation rules focus on the loss to the servient estate (e.g., 
                                                                                                             
 93. See, e.g., Talty v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 347 N.E.2d 74 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1976) (finding utility whose easement was granted by state agency over 
private property, could expand tower size and voltage of transmission lines 
within the scope of the easement it had acquired). A Maryland case presents an 
example of the servient estate holder possibly unsuccessfully attempting to 
bargain for additional compensation for expansion of the use of an easement for 
gas pipelines. See Reid v. Washington Gas Light Co., 194 A.2d 636, 639 (Md. 
1963). The easement provided that the gas company could install up to four 
additional pipelines within the first ten years of the easement upon paying a 
specified fee. Rather than add a line, however, the gas company replaced its 
existing line with a larger line that had an additional 75% capacity. The court 
rejected the argument that expanding the pipeline to a larger diameter would 
allow the gas company to indirectly accomplish the expansion without paying 
the fee. Rather, the court found, the additional fee provision covered creating 
additional trenches for new pipelines “would be less area to which the appellants 
could have free and full use of their property.” Id. at 639. Given this 
interpretation of the language of the easement, the court then found there was no 
violation of its terms to replace the existing pipeline with a larger capacity one. 
Since the new pipe had additional safety features and “was laid in the same 
exact location, no additional trench was necessary, and certainly it can not [sic] 
seriously be contended that the extra four inches of space in the ground the new 
pipe occupies is a substantial burden on the servient estate. It would be a 
different situation if the trench were much larger or if the pipe were sufficiently 
close to the surface to adversely affect its use by the servient property owners.” 
However, it noted that “[t]he expiration of the option meant that no more land 
could be burdened with additional lines in the absence of further negotiations 
and payment therefor.” Id.  
Note that bundling additional lines into a transmission line is generally 
cost efficient. See BLUME, supra note 14, at 50. However, in comparing a 
willing buyer-willing seller transaction to a condemnation award, the seller’s 
willingness to pay (measured by the total capacity the seller believes the LIE can 
handle taking into account the seller’s demand for capacity) should be relevant. 
In some instances, legislatures have intervened to allocate those gains to 
distribution easement holders. See, e.g., Salvaty v. Falcon Cable Television, 212 
Cal.Rptr. 31, 34 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (finding adding cable television lines 
to existing utility poles within the scope of the easement despite explicit 
language requiring servient landowner consent to changes because “[a]lthough 
the cable television industry did not exist at the time the easement was granted, 
it is part of the natural evolution of communications technology” citing state 
statute allowing utilities to provide access to their easements as evidence of “a 
strong public policy in favor of encouraging the type of cable attachments in this 
case.”); Hoffman v. Capitol Cablevision System, Inc., 383 N.Y.S.2d 674, 678 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (finding that adding cable equipment to existing 
distribution lines would not impose an additional burden, was consistent with 
the policy of broadly interpreting easements to meet progressive inventions, and 
that cable television rendered a valuable educational and public service despite 
explicit language in easement requiring servient landowner consent). Similarly, 
California permitted the City of Los Angeles to replace a street railway with 
buses without violating the terms of the easement for the street railway, finding 
that “[f]ifty years of technological change, embracing developments in internal 
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how much does the LIE reduce the value of the property) rather 
than the benefit of the LIE to the utility (e.g., how much revenue 
from use of the LIE can the utility generate), an eminent domain 
award will give the utility more of the surplus than it might receive 
in an arm’s length bargaining situation where its willingness to pay 
would be a relevant variable.94 Further, as the additional damage 
from expanding a LIE in the future is difficult to value, the 
landowner will be undercompensated to the extent the eminent 
domain process cannot fully capture the value of the future 
damage. 
Eminent domain thus results in a different outcome than would 
occur in a voluntary transaction. Where a willing buyer and seller 
negotiate the terms of a contract, the buyer’s willingness to pay is 
bounded by the benefits it receives from acquiring the property and 
the opportunity cost of its next best use of the resources in 
question; the seller’s willingness to accept is bounded by the 
opportunity cost of rejecting the offer and the value of the property 
in its existing use. The substitution of market valuation of property 
in the absence of the LIE means that courts will, at best, 
imperfectly assess the price at which a voluntary contract would 
occur. This problem is well known in the eminent domain 
literature.95 It is an inevitable consequence of the substitution of a 
judicial determination of price for a market determination. 
However, the problem is worse in the LIE context than elsewhere. 
Utilities’ unilateral power to shape easement terms that leave 
the door open to additional uses of the easement in the future are 
particularly problematic as they are extremely difficult to value 
today. For example, in the easement Oncor Electric Delivery 
Company condemned on properties in Texas, the company 
included the ability to install “all necessary or desirable 
appurtenances.”96 This leaves to Oncor’s judgment the decision of 
                                                                                                             
 
combustion vehicles and techniques of highway construction, have undoubtedly 
produced a situation in which motor buses have won public preference because 
of their greater flexibility of route and schedule.” Faus v. City of Los Angeles, 
431 P.2d 849, 852 (Cal. 1967). That the plaintiff was an entrepreneur who had 
obtained assignments of the interests of the original servient tenement owners 
may have also had an impact on the decision. 
 94. To the extent that eminent domain encourages utilities to pursue LIEs 
that are profitable only if they can purchase the property at the lower price 
enabled by eminent domain, it may result in misallocation of capital by the 
utilities. 
 95. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. 
REV. 61, 68 (1986). 
 96. See infra app. 3. 
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what to place on the easement in the future. The phrase used is so 
vague that it implies virtually no limit on what Oncor could place 
on the easement, contrary to the normal practice with respect to 
easements.97 Reducing the future value of the easement to a current 
payment is virtually impossible,98 making it highly likely that the 
landowner will be undercompensated for ceding significant control 
over the land to the LIE owner. 
Including broad terms in easements incentivizes utilities to use 
eminent domain rather than bargain to create LIEs and avoids 
efficient solutions to potential conflicts. In a voluntary negotiation 
over an easement, where a landowner sought an easement 
provision that the utility could provide more cheaply than the 
landowner could obtain elsewhere, the gains from trade would 
motivate the parties to include the term. For example, landowners 
may be concerned about potential lawsuits over incidents involving 
LIEs since the infrastructure placed on the LIE is frequently 
dangerous. Because the utility has a significant degree of control 
over the operation of the infrastructure and the risks involved, and 
because the utility is in the best position to insure against such 
risks, one would expect that utilities could offer indemnification 
and insurance to the landowner at a significantly lower cost than 
the individual landowner could procure elsewhere (if such 
insurance were even commercially available). It has been our 
experience that utilities not using eminent domain to procure LIEs 
often provide indemnification and insurance to the servient estate 
holder. However, if the cost of procuring alternative insurance is 
difficult to prove—as it is where the insurance is not commercially 
available—a utility using eminent domain has little incentive to 
offer to provide indemnification and insurance. This is because 
making the offer will not affect the eminent domain award by 
much, but the offer will increase the utility’s costs. Thus, wherever 
the price of not providing indemnification in the eminent domain 
proceeding is less than the cost of providing it, the utility will not 
                                                                                                             
 97. 2 THOMPSON, supra note 8, §426 at 657 (“The dominant owner cannot 
increase the burden of the easement without the consent of the servient owner. 
The owner of a right-of-way cannot materially increase the burden of the 
servient estate nor impress and new and additional burden thereon. But normal 
development by the owner of the easement is permissible.”).  
 98. The current value would be a function of the probability distribution of 
future uses as well as the harm caused by such uses in the future. Even if the 
utility provided good faith estimates of its possible future uses, something we 
are skeptical would occur, those estimates would be inaccurate. Leaving the 
valuation damage caused by future uses until it occurs by restricting eminent 
domain-based LIEs to specified uses or leaving the matter to negotiation, would 
postpone the valuation until more information was available, reducing 
uncertainty. 
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do so even if the benefit to the landowner of the indemnification 
exceeds the cost to the utility of providing it. 
Indemnification is an excellent example because it is such an 
important factor for landowners who face significant risk from 
LIEs on their properties. For example, under Texas law, certain 
activities are prohibited around high voltage overhead lines. Not 
only are there criminal penalties for engaging in such activities 
(including operating certain types of machinery without a 
statutorily required warning),99 but the statute provides civil 
liability for the property owner in favor of the utility for any 
contacts with the line in violation of the statute.100 In a 1984 
federal court opinion, the Fifth Circuit held that the statute’s 
inclusion of a provision providing that:  
[I]f a violation of this chapter results in physical or 
electrical contact with a high voltage overhead line, the 
person, firm, corporation, or association that committed the 
violation is liable to the owner or operator of the line for all 
damages to the facilities and for all liability that the owner 
or operator incurs as a result of the contact.101  
This meant that the utility was completely indemnified by the 
landowner for any claims arising out of any violation of the statute 
even for the utility’s own negligence.102 A subsequent Texas court 
opinion extended this interpretation to hold the “violator” 
responsible for the power line operator’s attorney’s fees, costs, and 
interest.103 Under the literal terms of the statute, the landowner 
would also be responsible for damages and attorney’s fees in any 
lawsuit brought by a customer against the utility for a service 
interruption caused by the utility’s own negligence if the 
landowner’s conduct was also a factor in the accident.104  
In general, servitudes provide a mechanism by which property 
owners can create permanent solutions that reallocate property 
rights to maximize the total value of a bundle of rights. Where a 
                                                                                                             
 99. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 752.007 (West 2010). 
 100. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 752.008 (West Supp. 2014). 
 101. Moore v. Sw. Elec. Power Co., 737 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(quoting Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 1436c, emphasis omitted). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Olson v. Cent. Power & Light Co., 803 S.W.2d 808, 815 (Tex. App. 
1991). 
 104. By contrast, the default rule for easements was traditionally that the 
“owner of an easement or right-of-way over the lands of another must maintain 
it in a state of good repair and efficiency so that no unnecessary damage will 
result from its use to the servient estate.” 2 THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 428 at 
674. 
62 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. 3 
 
 
 
particular use does not require fee ownership, such reallocations 
are efficient. Recognizing that these reallocations may create 
future conflicts, the parties to voluntarily negotiated reallocations 
can create—and courts will enforce—mechanisms to incentivize 
value-maximizing behavior and to compensate for failure to 
deliver on promises. Not all easements are created as the result of 
negotiation, however, and the next subsection examines the lessons 
for LIEs of how courts create easements in the absence of 
negotiation.  
C. Courts’ capability to address LIEs 
When an easement is created by prescription, implication, or 
necessity, the court deciding the case sets the terms of the 
easement.105 As a substitute for bargaining, courts have taken on 
the role of settling the terms of the easement. Notably, easements 
by necessity are rarely created simply because “the claimant would 
have to spend substantial time or money to construct a road on his 
or her own land.”106 Rather, they require relatively stringent 
conditions be satisfied, generally including a prior unity between 
the burdened and benefited parcels.107 This reluctance to substitute 
court-ordered property relationships for bargaining suggests the 
judiciary has recognized the problems created by involuntary 
easements.108 When a court has made such a substitution, the 
                                                                                                             
 105. Even in these cases, the courts historically used the language of intent. 4 
POWELL, supra note 8, § 34.07[1] at 3447. Powell argues that “[t]hese fictional 
implications of ‘intent’ are actually rooted in considerations of public policy.” 
Id. See also 2 THOMPSON, supra note 8, §351 at 287 (“Theoretically, an implied 
easement is based on the presumed intention of the parties as garnered from the 
surrounding circumstances rather than on the language of the deed.”).  
 106. 4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 34.07[3] at 3457. 
 107. GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS, 
REAL COVENANTS, AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES § 3.08(a), 3.08(12)-(13) (2d ed. 
2004). See also 2 THOMPSON, supra note 8, §355, at 34245 (describing limitations 
on easements by necessity). 
 108. Even with easements created by agreement, where the parties have left 
terms unspecified, the courts must sometimes step in to craft a solution to a 
conflict. See, e.g., McConnell v. Golden, 247 A.2d 909 (R.I. 1968) (court held to 
designate location for easement where servient estate owner had refused to do so 
for 15 years and there was no agreement as to location of easement); Daniel v. 
Clarkson, 338 S.W.2d 691 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960) (finding that trial court had 
authority to locate easement in a case where the lack of evidence on the issue 
because of parties’ failure to previously locate easement or use it regularly 
“taxes the best resources of judicial ingenuity.”). See also Ark. Valley Elec. 
Coop. Corp. v. Brinks, 400 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Ark. 1966) (court noting in dicta 
that trial court would have been justified in placing easement for power line 
where it minimized damage to servient estate.) This role for the courts in 
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authorities generally argue that the easements must be interpreted 
flexibly, to adapt to the “well-known likelihood of changing 
property uses.”109 This is quite different from courts’ approach to 
easements created voluntarily, where they are more inclined to 
force the property owners to live with the bargain they struck. 
Moreover, at least some courts have claimed the equitable power 
to alter the terms of easements by necessity after their creation, and 
have specifically distinguished easements created by courts from 
those created by the parties through a document; the Third 
Restatement has adopted this position as well.110 
Indeed, courts are frequently willing to engage in relatively 
aggressive interpretation of easements to resolve conflicts between 
the dominant and servient interest owners. For example:  
[I]t is often said that the parties are presumed to have 
contemplated such a scope for the created easement as 
would reasonably serve the purposes of the grant. This 
provides a factor of elasticity, which has been most useful. 
Under this presumption, many courts have liberally read in 
expansions of the permitted use caused by technological 
innovations, by subsequent developments of the locality, or 
                                                                                                             
 
handling conflicts caused by changes in land use where the easement is created 
involuntarily is consistent with our view that a check on unilateral creation of 
terms in eminent domain proceedings is needed. 
 109. 4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 34.079[3] at 34-56.1. See also 2 THOMPSON, 
supra note 8, §366 at 420 (noting the use of an implied way of necessity “must 
be as reasonable and as little burdensome to the servient estate as the nature and 
purposes permit. Whenever an easement has arisen from necessity, it is 
generally held coextensive with the reasonable need, present and future, of the 
dominant estate for such a right or easement, and to vary with the necessity, in 
so far as may be consistent with the full, reasonable enjoyment of the servient 
estate as the nature and purposes permit.”). 
 110. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Johnson, 591 S.E.2d 34, 37 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003) 
(holding that “[m]any of the cases adopting the traditional rule deal with express 
easements-not with easements created by necessity. We recognize that it should 
be more difficult to relocate an express easement, as it is akin to a contract and 
is bargained for by the parties.”); Soderberg v. Weisel, 687 A.2d 839 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1997); Kline v. Bernardsville Ass’n, Inc., 631 A.2d 1263 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1993); RFS, Inc., v. Cohen, 772 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); 
Ramsey v. Johnson, 312 So.2d 671 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Sedillo Title Guaranty, 
Inc. v. Wagner, 457 P.2d 361 (N.M. 1969); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 4.8. But see Thomason v. Kern & Co., 376 S.E.2d 
872 (Ga. 1980); Edgell v. Divver, 402 A.2d 395 (Del. Ch. 1979); Davis v. Bruk, 
411 A.2d 660 (Me. 1980); Daviess-Martin County v. Meadows, 386 N.E.2d 
1000 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). 
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by changes in the use of the dominant parcel said to have 
been contemplated by the parties.111  
This willingness to aggressively resolve ambiguities or changed 
circumstances, for which the parties did not provide, illustrates 
both the capacity of courts to address the details of easements, and 
the need for them to do so in circumstances where the parties have 
failed to do so ex ante. It is thus a peculiarity that courts, with such 
broad powers to expand easements, do not also have a similar 
power to control the shaping of easements when the easements are 
taken without negotiation by eminent domain. Granting the courts 
such power is thus both consistent with existing practice with 
respect to non-eminent domain, non-LIE easements and the 
capacity of courts generally to serve as an alternative to bargaining 
ex post where the bargaining did not take place. 
D. Joint ownership as a model  
Although the interests in LIEs taken by utilities for 
transmission lines, pipelines, and telecommunications lines are 
formally easements, we contend that the relationships LIEs create 
are in many respects closer to a tenancy in common in the 
underlying land than an easement.112 Easements often deal with 
restrictions on a landowner’s use of his land (e.g., restraints on 
building to prevent blocking views or, more recently, to promote 
conservation) or with permitting activities that would otherwise be a 
trespass (e.g., crossing land). Easements were traditionally 
considered non-possessory land interests,113 involving only “a 
limited use or enjoyment of the servient tenement.”114 Common-law 
easements were thus “a negative thing, a right or privilege to be 
immune from action if one made a certain use of another’s realty. It 
did not contemplate compelling another to take a positive action 
                                                                                                             
 111. See 4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 34.12 at 34–140 to 34–142; Jakobsen v. 
Colonial Pipeline Co. 397 S.E.2d 435 (Ga. 1990); Westphal v. Kentucky 
Utilities Co. 343 S.W.2d 367 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960). 
 112. One important legal difference between concurrent ownership of 
interests in land and easements is that concurrent ownership interests “as the 
term is generally understood, is simultaneously ownership of (the same) 
individual interests in property. Thus, if A and W together own a present interest 
in land for the life of A, then A and W are co-owners.” NATELSON, supra note 
72, § 2.7, at 31. The simplest cotenancy is the tenancy in common, which 
requires only that the cotenants own the same interest in the land. See Id. § 2.10, 
at 37. 
 113. See 4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 34.01[1], at 34-5 (noting that easements 
are “non-possessory land interests”). 
 114. Id. § 34.02[1], at 34-11. 
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with respect to his own property for the benefit of the person 
holding the easement.”115 This is less true of LIEs than easements, 
as the utility is not only sharing possession of the land with the 
servient estate holder by physically placing structures on the land 
which significantly limit the servient estate holder’s ability to use 
the land, but it is also likely to be regularly present physically on 
the land to conduct inspection and maintenance.  
This is particularly true where the existence of the easement 
compels a change in land management practices, or where the 
utility’s actions have significant impacts on the landowner. For 
example, controlling invasive weeds requires careful management 
of vehicle traffic on agricultural land to prevent weed seeds being 
carried from one area from taking hold in another, as well as 
restoration of land disturbed by activity, periodic inspections of 
property disturbed, and revegetation of disturbed areas.116 It also 
requires regular burning of the land, something often not possible 
when there is a LIE. 
A similar problem comes with the broad access to the property 
included in utility-drafted LIEs. For example, Oncor typically 
includes the right to install as many gates as it wishes in the 
landowner’s fence to allow access to its easement.117 This is a 
significant reduction in rural landowners’ ability to control access 
to their properties—something that is particularly important in 
protecting livestock and limiting access to authorized persons 
during hunting season. Moreover, not only does Oncor claim the 
right to enter the easement at any time without notice to the 
landowner, but also, the terms of its easement place no limit on the 
number of duplicate keys it can distribute for the locks on those 
gates.118 This loss of control is particularly difficult to value in the 
condemnation process, as there is no market for such access rights 
                                                                                                             
 115. 2 THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 318, at 31. 
 116. See supra notes 49 to 53 and accompanying text. 
 117. See infra app. 3. 
 118. See infra app. 3. The valuation of this loss of control is particularly 
problematic. Rural landowners may be – certainly if our experience is any guide, 
they definitely are – particularly sensitive to issues of access to their land. But 
even setting aside any particular sensibility, control of access is both important 
with respect to protecting livestock from theft and the value of hunting rights. 
On the former, consider the key role of control of access from the initial 
settlement of the portion of the Great Plains in Texas compared to the 
experience in the northern plains, where the presence of public land prevented 
such control. See Andrew P. Morriss, Returning Justice to its Private Roots, 68 
U. CHI. L. REV. 551, 554–58 (2001); Andrew P. Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes & 
Cattlemen: Overcoming Free Rider Problems in the Private Provision of Law, 
33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 581, 601–07 (1998). 
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because few landowners would consent to unlimited distribution of 
keys to their gates by third parties. 
Property law regularly deals with jointly owned property. A 
and B may own Blackacre as joint tenants or cotenants (or, if 
married and in a state which recognizes the estate, as tenants by the 
entirety). Joint owners of property have well-defined legal rights 
and obligations, which courts turn to in the event of a disagreement 
among the joint owners. Moreover, there are well-established 
remedies, including judicial partition or sale of property when the 
joint owners are in conflict. Generally, the law provides three key 
methods of resolving conflicts among co-owners of land that 
would address the problems existing in LIE relationships. 
First, and most importantly, co-owners have a right of exit 
from the relationship available to them. When tenants in common 
or joint tenants no longer wish to be cotenants, they have the right 
to partition.119 “Every cotenant has the right to compel partition” 
unless the cotenants’ agreements or acts modify or eliminate that 
right.120 The right to partition “is unconditional and cannot be 
defeated by a mere showing that a partition would be inconvenient, 
injurious, or even ruinous to an adverse party.”121 The right “is 
designed to prevent a forced continuation of shared ownership of 
property.”122 As Powell notes, “[t]o deny it is to effectively expand 
the property rights of one cotenant at the expense of other 
cotenants.”123 This is similar to the right of exit in partnerships and 
reflects similar concerns: where the parties do not share a common 
objective, forcing them into an economic union is particularly 
problematic. 124 
                                                                                                             
 119. Indeed, joint tenants (who share a right of survivorship) have an even 
more powerful right of partition, for any may sever one the four unities required 
to create a joint tenancy by conveying his or her interest to some other person. 
NATELSON, supra note 72, § 2.8, at 34. 
 120. 7 POWELL, supra note 8, § 50.07[1], at 50–37. Interests insufficient to 
create cotenancies do not create the right to partition. II AMERICAN LAW OF 
PROPERTY, supra note 71, § 6.22 at 98 (“Persons having interests in the property 
which do not make them cotenants cannot maintain an action of partition. 
Therefore a widow having a right of dower cannot enforce partition, nor can her 
dower be affected by partition between the co-owners of the fee which must be 
made subject to her dower in the absence of a statute to the contrary.”). 
 121. 7 POWELL, supra note 8, § 50.07[3][a], at 50–41. 
 122. Id. at 50-41 to 50-42 (citing Eisenberg v. Tuchman, 892 A.2d 1016 
(Conn. App. 2006)).  
 123. Id. (citing Robinson v. Evans, 554 A.2d 332 (D.C. 1989)). 
 124. Larry E. Ribstein, A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissolution, 65 
Wash. U. L. Q. 357, 390 (1987) (“an individual partner who is locked into a 
partnership after circumstances cause the relationship to become onerous may 
suffer substantial losses in the value of his financial and human capital over an 
extended period. A partner’s abusive exercise of the dissociation right may 
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Partitions may be accomplished by judicial division or by sale 
and division of the proceeds.125 Common law partition was 
equitable in nature, which “suggests that courts should consider all 
relevant circumstances to ensure that complete justice is done.”126 
In addition, as Professor Casner notes, partition serves the interests 
of judicial economy as well, preventing the courts from being 
drawn into “the many questions which may arise between the 
cotenants in their use and enjoyment of the common property. The 
law cannot possibly settle such details where the cotenants do not 
agree.”127 Given the large number of margins on which utilities 
and many landowners must continually interact as a result of the 
taking of a LIE, providing a right of exit is both necessary to level 
the playing field for bargaining, and allows landowners to end 
dysfunctional relationships with utilities. One might object that 
allowing landowners to exit would cause serious problems for the 
operation of a transmission line or pipeline. But the most likely 
consequence of allowing a right of exit as the default would not be 
idiosyncratic  use of exit rights after the utility had constructed its 
line or pipeline but negotiations at the inception of the relationship 
over the conditions under which exit might be exercised.  
Moreover, providing exit rights in involuntary easements would 
incentivize utilities to negotiate voluntary LIEs rather than use 
eminent domain. Additionally, exit rights can be limited in scope 
to prevent stranding capital investments. For example, they might 
be exercisable only at particular intervals. 
Second, cotentants owe each other a duty not to commit 
waste.128 In the past, issues concerning waste often arose in the 
context of a life tenant and remainderman, and the courts had some 
difficulty in specifying the contours of the doctrine where there 
                                                                                                             
 
cause all of the non-dissociating partners to give up partnership assets without 
adequate compensation or to lose the benefit of firm specific human capital. But 
even if the non-dissociating partners as a group might suffer a greater loss in the 
event of abusive dissociation than a single locked-in partner might suffer 
without a dissociation right, each partner is more likely ex ante to focus on his 
risk than on the aggregate. Assuming the partners cannot predict ex ante whether 
they will belong to the dissociating or the non-dissociating group, they would 
want an agreement that minimized the graver costs borne by locked-in partners. 
Moreover, on a more objective basis, a loss that is spread among individuals has 
less impact than the same loss borne by one individual.”). 
 125. See 7 POWELL, supra note 8, § 50.07[1], at 50-37. Partition in kind is 
the default unless the parties stipulate to a sale, prove a physical division cannot 
be fairly done or is impracticable. Id. § 50.07[4][a], at 50-46.2. 
 126. Id. § 50.07[3][a], at 50-41. 
 127. II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 71, § 6.18 at 78. 
 128. See 7 POWELL, supra note 8, § 50.03[3], at 50-21.  
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were co-owners in fee. A review of American precedent led to 
what Casner termed “hopeless confusion.”129 Doing the best he 
could with the confusion, Casner’s treatise, The American Law of 
Property, concluded that “a cotenant in fee is properly liable for 
waste when his use of the property is not in the exercise of his right 
of reasonable enjoyment, and when such use results in permanent 
injury to the property.”130 Under English precedent, following the 
Statute of Anne, cotenants must account to other cotenants if the 
cotenant obtains “more than his just share and proportion” of the 
rewards of ownership.131 In the United States, most states follow a 
more expansive rule requiring the occupying cotenant to “account 
for outside rental income received for use of the land, offset by 
credits for maintenance expenses. If the use, such as extracting 
minerals, reduces the value of the property, the occupant must 
account for the income.”132 Similarly, where one owner has a right 
to remove materials from the real property of another, courts have 
held that each “was entitled to prevent the other from exercising its 
rights of ownership of the severed estate arbitrarily, capriciously, 
oppressively or wantonly, but each must engage in reasonable, 
prudent management.”133  
Incorporating the duties not to commit waste or to “engage in 
reasonable, prudent management” into LIEs would provide a 
flexible means to address the myriad issues that might arise 
between a landowner and a utility over shared access to a LIE, 
without requiring full specification of all issues in advance. For 
example, many rangeland landowners license hunters to use 
servient tenements, including the area covered by the easement. A 
utility that scheduled inspection and maintenance work during 
hunting season would interfere with hunting access, both by 
scaring game and by limiting hunters’ ability to hunt in areas 
where crews were working. The duty not to commit waste could be 
used to require a utility that reduced the hunting value of the 
servient estate to compensate the landowner. 
Third, at times the law imposes a fiduciary relationship on 
cotenants, “which may require a cotenant to protect and secure 
                                                                                                             
 129. See II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 71, § 6.15 at 65. 
 130. Id. at 66. 
 131. 7 POWELL, supra note 8, § 50.04[1], at 50-22 (quoting 4 Anne ch. 16 § 
27 (1705)). 
 132. Id. § 50.04[1], 50-23 to 50-24. 
 133. 1A THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 164, at 69–70. Thompson also notes that 
“[i]n a mineral lease, the surface estate is servient to the mineral estate for the 
purpose of the mineral grant, but even such right is to be reasonably exercised 
with due regard to the rights of the owner of the surface.” Id. § 164, at 75. It also 
must be exercised in light of “the custom of the community.” Id. § 164, at 77. 
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their common interests.”134 For example, where one cotenant 
insured a property against fire, she was required to share the 
proceeds with the other cotenants despite having been the only one 
to pay the premiums and the only one named on the policy.135 This 
duty justifies applying “close scrutiny” to dealings between 
cotenants “to guard against fraud or overreaching.”136 This 
suggests a rationale for courts to give close scrutiny to dealings 
between the eminent domain taker and the landowner. In the 
business law context, fiduciary obligations are often justified as a 
majoritarian default rule.  
Larry Ribstein, who took a relatively narrow view of the scope 
of fiduciary duties, argued that this was justified because “[a] duty 
of self-abnegation is only rarely appropriate in a competitive 
marketplace. Such a duty is usually excessively costly when applied 
to commercial dealings because it undermines the incentives that 
motivate business people to provide high-quality goods and 
services.”137 Ribstein contended that in business, the rule should 
focus “on the particular type of entrustment that arises from a 
property owner’s delegation to a manager of open-ended 
management power over property without corresponding economic 
rights.”138 This certainly would include the owner of an 
involuntarily-granted LIE. If landowners and utilities which exercise 
eminent domain to take a LIE are viewed as being in an involuntary 
business relationship, with the problem of maximizing the joint 
surplus from the simultaneous operation of the LIE and the servient 
estate, imposing fiduciary obligations on both parties to the 
easement can substitute for considerable detail in specifying the 
terms. 
                                                                                                             
 134. 7 POWELL, supra note 8, § 50.04[3], at 50-28 (citing Edwards v. Farm 
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co, 823 S.W.2d 903 (Ark. 1992); Caffey v. Caffey 625 S.W.2d 
444 (Ark. 1981); Brown v. Brown, 563 S.W.2d 444 (Ark. 1978)). See also 1A 
THOMPSON, supra note 8, §170, at 101–102 (“Like lateral cotentants, tenants in 
common, joint tenants and tenants by the entireties, vertical cotenants, mineral 
severances, mineral lessees, purchasers of profits and owners of the freehold 
have a certain amount of fiduciary relationship.”). 
 135. Edwards v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 903 (Ark. 1992). 
 136. 7 POWELL, supra note 8, § 50.04[3], at 50-28 (citing Rose v. Roso, 204 
P.2d 1075 (Colo. 1950); McArthur v. Dumaw, 43 N.W.2d 924 (Mich. 1950); 
Watts v. Krebs, 962 P.2d 387 (Idaho 1998); Howard v. Wactor, 41 So.2d 259 
(Miss. 1949); Dolan v. Cummings, 102 N.Y.S. 91 (1907) aff’d 86 N.E. 1123 
(N.Y. 1908); Sperry v. Tolley, 199 P.2d 542 (Utah 1948); Woodard v. 
Carpenter, 195 P.2d 983 (Wash. 1948)).  
 137. Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 BOSTON U. L. REV. 
899, 903 (2011). 
 138. Id. at 901. 
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Both the duty to avoid waste and fiduciary obligations might 
address two important issues that arise in LIEs. First, in general, 
the default rule for easements is that the responsibility for 
maintenance and repair costs necessary “for the full enjoyment of 
the easement” rests with the easement owner; “the dominant owner 
is normally considered to have a duty to make such repairs as are 
necessary to permit the servient owner to have reasonable use of 
his or her tenement, and to have the privilege of making such 
repairs as are necessary to effectuate the purposes for which the 
easement was created.”139 Second, utilities make use of contractors 
for work on easements and sometimes argue they are not liable for 
harms created by these contractors.140 
E. Joint ownership issues  
Where two or more owners share interests in land, the law 
sometimes has to confront “[m]ore complex problems”141 than 
when neighbors’ use of land causes conflicts. This section 
discusses how these affect the relationship between utilities and 
servient estate holders in the context of LIEs in three areas: 
interpreting the easement terms, modification of the easement, and 
termination of the easement. 
1. Interpreting terms 
LIEs are burdensome for the servient estate holder for many 
reasons. The most obvious—literally—is that the infrastructure 
placed on LIEs is often unattractive. Reportedly, Frank Lloyd 
Wright phoned President Franklin D. Roosevelt to demand the 
removal of high-voltage lines obstructing the view from his 
Scottsdale, Arizona home.142 Infrastructure interferes with radio 
and television signals.143 It can charge ungrounded nearby 
objects,144 which can be a problem for rural landowners who have 
metal fencing, gates, and irrigation equipment near LIEs. It 
                                                                                                             
 139. 4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 34.12, at 34-146 to 34-147. 
 140. See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.  
 141. See 4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 34.07[1], at 34-49. 
 142. Karady, Environmental Impact supra note 58, at 20-1. 
 143. Id. at 20-15. 
 144. Id. at 20-13. Interestingly, LCRA initially grounded the gates it placed 
on Morriss’ in-laws’ property but not his in-laws’ existing gates, suggesting the 
utility valued protecting its employees from electric shock but was not 
concerned about the servient estate owner, its employees, or livestock. Only 
after this point came up during the commissioner’s hearing did LCRA ground 
the property owner’s gates. 
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produces magnetic fields, which may or may not have long-term 
health effects, but are controversial,145 and are likely to reduce 
property values by reducing the number of buyers interested in a 
property. 
Where the terms of any easement are not clearly delineated in 
the documents creating it (or where one party seeks to press its 
advantage despite clear terms), there may be important conflicts 
between the easement owner and the servient estate owner. This is 
because the existence of the easement requires a balancing of 
competing interests as “[t]he scope of any easement finds an outer 
limit in the privilege of the servient owner to make such uses of the 
servient parcel as are not incompatible with the use authorized by 
the easement.”146 Or, as one court put it, “[o]f necessity, the 
interests of the owner of the easement often conflict with the 
interest of the owner of the burdened estate. By law, however, each 
of the parties owes certain duties to the other.”147 
Courts have dealt with these conflicts on a regular basis. For 
example, a Kentucky court found that an easement permitting use 
of the servient estate “for the removal over and through said land, 
(of) the products taken out of any other land owned or hereafter 
acquired” by the easement holder did not include the right to 
process coal and dump refuse on the servient estate.148 The court 
noted, “While dumping refuse may be an integral part of the 
mining operation on a particular tract, it is not an authorized 
incident of removing coal from other tracts.”149  
                                                                                                             
 145. Id. at 20-8 (“The health effect of magnetic field remains a controversial 
topic in spite of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency report that 
concluded that the low frequency, low level electric, and magnetic fields are not 
producing any health risks. Many people believe that the prudent approach is 
‘prudent avoidance’ to long-term exposure.”); Peter Dent & Sally Sims, 
Introduction, in TOWERS, TURBINES AND TRANSMISSION LINES: IMPACTS ON 
PROPERTY VALUE 1, 3 (Sally Bond, Sally Sims, & Peter Dent, eds. 2013) (“One 
important aspect in considering the impact of HVOTLs, cell towers and wind 
turbines on individual property values is the level of risk that an individual 
perceives as existing in a set of circumstances.”); Dent & Sims, Risk Perception, 
in TOWERS, TURBINES AND TRANSMISSION LINES: IMPACTS ON PROPERTY 
VALUE 27, 37 (“If factors such as health, aesthetics and nuisance are considered 
to cause property stigma in specific cases, and these factors are considered to 
have an impact on the value of a property, then this needs to be incorporated into 
a valuer’s toolkit and quantified.”). In addition, some studies have shown that 
voluntariness of exposure influences acceptance of risk. Id. at 32.  
 146. 4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 34.14, at 34-156. 
 147. Center Drive-In Theater, Inc. v. City of Derby, 352 A.2d 304, 307 
(Conn. 1974). 
 148.  Hi Hat Elkhorn Mining Co. v. Newman, 352 S.W.2d 71, 72 (Ky. 1961). 
 149. Id. 
72 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. 3 
 
 
 
Similarly, where an easement permitted an adjacent landowner 
to maintain a drainage ditch across the servient estate, the 
California Supreme Court held that this did not require the servient 
estate owner to incur the expense of fencing off or covering the 
ditch to prevent cattle grazing on his land from damaging the 
banks, finding that:  
[I]f the plaintiff’s theory be correct, the defendant cannot 
use his land as a pasture, though that may be the best and 
perhaps only profitable use he can make of it, unless he 
employs men to patrol the ditch and keep the cattle away 
from it, or goes to the expense of fencing it in or covering it 
with bridges. It does not seem to us that the plaintiff’s 
easement on the land can impose any such burden as that 
on the defendant.150  
In another case, where the easement owner damaged the 
underlying estate, the courts took a similar approach. Where the 
owner of a pipeline easement removed a portion of a flood control 
dike during construction of its pipeline and did not replace it when 
construction was completed, the court held that the easement 
owner was liable for the cost of the repair.151 More generally, the 
courts have concluded that where easements fail to be clear about 
the responsibility for maintenance and repair costs necessary “for 
the full enjoyment of the easement,” then “the dominant owner is 
normally considered to have a duty to make such repairs as are 
necessary to permit the servient owner to have reasonable use of 
his or her tenement, and to have the privilege of making such 
repairs as are necessary to effectuate the purposes for which the 
easement was created.”152  
Courts have drawn from these cases the general principle that 
“[t]he owner of an easement has all rights incident or necessary to 
its proper enjoyment, but nothing more.”153 At the same time, 
“[t]he owner of the servient estate may not use the property subject 
to the easement in a way that would lead to a material increase in 
the cost or inconvenience to the easement holder’s exercise of his 
rights.”154 Applying these principles in a LIE case involving 
transmission lines, where the utility sought to block construction of 
                                                                                                             
 150. Durfee v. Garvey, 21 P. 302, 303 (Cal. 1889). 
 151. Ctr. Drive-In Theater, Inc., 352 A.2d at 309.  
 152. 4 POWELL, supra note 8 § 34.12, at 34-146 to 34-147. 
 153. Ctr. Drive-In Theater, Inc., 352 A.2d at 307.  
 154. Texon, Inc. v. Holyoke Mach. Co., 394 N.E.2d 976, 978 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1979). 
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a parking lot beneath the line, the court held a reasonableness 
standard applied to balancing the rights of the two parties.155  
Because there are often design issues with respect to many 
LIEs that impact the servient estate, this reasonableness standard 
will prove critical in resolving conflicts likely to arise between 
utilities and servient estate owners. However, these issues would 
be better dealt with through negotiations in creating the easement, 
which the current structure of eminent domain law precludes. For 
example, high voltage lines can produce an unpleasant audible 
noise.156 This noise can be minimized during design, generally by 
increasing conductor size and/or the “air-gap spacing.”157 Both 
measures increase the utility’s costs. Similarly, design of a high 
voltage line influences the types of inspection and maintenance 
activities necessary to maintain it,158 and improper design can 
cause problems as lines sag and elongate due to weather and 
loading. Preventing these problems requires technical knowledge 
landowners are unlikely to possess,159 and suggests that the burden 
of avoiding these problems is efficiently placed on the utility. 
Further, a check on utility-drafted LIE documents is needed 
because utilities often do a poor job of drafting the easement terms. 
For example, Oncor included in its easement (imposed via eminent 
domain) a requirement that landowners comply with all applicable 
laws before installing streets, water lines, sewer lines, telephone 
                                                                                                             
 155. W. Mass. Elec. Co. v. Sambo’s of Mass., Inc., 398 N.E.2d 729, 735 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1979). 
 156. Karady, Environmental Impact, supra note 58, at 20-14. Karady states 
that the audible noise “produced in fair weather conditions is negligible,” 
although the authors have observed audible noise under fair weather conditions. 
Id. 
 157. BLUME, supra note 14, at 57. 
 158. See Joe C. Pohlman, Transmission Line Structures, in ELECTRIC POWER 
GENERATION, TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION 10-1, 10-4 to 10-5 (Leonard L. 
Grigsby ed., 3d ed. 2012); Green et al., supra note 56, at 12-10 to 12-14 
(describing maintenance procedures). 
 159. See Dale A. Douglass & E. Ridley Thrash, Sag and Tension of 
Conductor, in ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION AND 
DISTRIBUTION 15-1 (Leonard L. Grigsby ed., 3d ed. 2012) (“The energized 
conductors of transmission and distribution lines must be placed to totally 
eliminate the possibility of injury to people. Overhead conductors, however, 
elongate with time, temperature, and tension, thereby changing their original 
position after installation. Despite the effects of weather and loading on a line, 
the conductors must remain at safe distances from buildings, objects, and people 
or vehicles passing beneath the line at all times. To ensure this safety, the shape 
of the terrain along the right-of-way, the height and lateral position of the 
conductor support points, and the position of the conductor between support 
points under all wind, ice, and temperature conditions must be known.”). 
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cables, “etc.” within the easement.160 Checking “all applicable laws” 
is an absurd responsibility for a utility experienced in operating 
transmission lines to impose on a landowner. Similarly, Oncor’s 
easement required that landowners not make any change in grade, 
elevation or contour of the land without written permission from the 
utility, specifically prohibiting terraces, road work, drainage ditches, 
excavations, or “soil disturbing activities.”161 Exempted were 
“normal agricultural activities,” a term left undefined in the 
easement.162 Notably, the easement included no provision requiring 
Oncor to respond within a reasonable time or specified time to a 
request from the landowner.163 Landowners need a mechanism by 
which they can request courts to adjust the terms of easements at the 
time of the taking to clarify the rights and obligations of the parties. 
This will not only facilitate proper valuation of the interest taken but 
will also reduce future transaction costs. These are primarily 
examples of shoddy draftsmanship, but the existence of such poor 
quality lawyering in critical documents is itself an illustration of the 
incentive problems created by failing to provide a check on the 
unilateral imposition of terms. Allowing a utility to unilaterally 
impose poorly drafted terms needlessly increases future transaction 
costs and complicates the valuation exercise. 
Finally, many conflicts among landowners in a community are 
resolved informally, without the need for litigation.164 Utility LIE 
owners lack the incentives necessary to make such informal 
resolutions work, and also have the resources to out-lawyer 
individual landowners with the threat of costly litigation. 
2. Modification 
Power and communications technologies change over time, as 
do population patterns and needs. Anticipating change in these 
industries suggests that LIEs should be limited to specific periods 
to allow renegotiation in the future when more is known about 
future needs. Long-lived LIEs are more problematic than many 
other easements. Barring the development of personal jetpacks or 
Star Trek-style transporters, landlocked parcels will require access 
to transportation networks. However, the same is not true of 
utilities and LIEs. For example, 30 years ago, the Lower Colorado 
                                                                                                             
 160. See infra app. 3. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS 
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).  
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River Authority (LCRA) was heavily invested in developing 
lignite coal resources in the Austin, Texas area, enraging 
environmental activists.165 Today, the LCRA is investing heavily 
in wind power in the Texas panhandle, delighting the 
environmental activists and upsetting rural landowners along the 
transmission corridor.166 In addition, one LIE attracts another. 
Once a utility easement crosses a property, other utilities seek to 
make use of the easement as well, and they argue that a second 
easement’s damage to property values is minimal. In Texas, the 
Public Utilities Commission encourages new LIEs to parallel 
existing ones. Providing a means for the modification of LIEs to 
cope with changes in technology and population patterns as well as 
the potential for additional LIEs is thus important. Courts will need 
to be able to cope with changes in LIEs over time. Of course, 
better drafting in the creation of the LIE would reduce the number 
of instances in which a court would be called on, but the need for 
some modifications in light of changed circumstances is virtually 
certain to occur no matter how carefully the initial easement is 
drafted. 
One example that suggests how courts might approach 
modifications to LIEs as circumstances change comes from a 
Kentucky transmission line case. In that case, the servient estate 
owner graded the land under the lines, raising the ground level by 
seven feet, and the utility sought to recover the cost of raising the 
lines.167 The court began its analysis by noting that: 
[F]rom the very nature of an electrical transmission line 
and its occupancy of air space rather than surface area, the 
scope of the easement is somewhat fluid. Neither the rights 
                                                                                                             
 165. See BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, PROPOSED CAMP SWIFT LIGNITE 
LEASING, BASTROP COUNTY, TEXAS 1-1 (1st ed. 1980); BILL OLIVER, NOT SO 
FAST, L.C.R.A (Live Oak Records 1982). 
 166. See American Council on Renewable Energy, Renewable Energy in 
Texas (Jan. 2014), http://www.acore.org/files/pdfs/states/Texas.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6Q2E-54HU (summarizing the state’s efforts to boost 
renewables: Texas leads the nation in wind power generation, with more than 
twice the installed capacity as the next closest state. In addition, Texas has more 
biodiesel capacity than any other state in the nation.); Bill Peacock, Texas Wind 
Power: New Record, Bad Economics (and capacity inhibitor for future 
reliability) (Mar. 12, 2013), https://www.masterresource.org/texas/setting-the-
record-straight-on-renewable-energy-subsidies/, archived at http://perma.cc 
/99Y-BBFG (describing Texas’ renewable energy programs); Sam Pakan, The 
Great Texas Wind Hoax: Property Owners vs. the State (Part 1), PATRIOT 
UPDATE (Apr. 8, 2011), http://patriotupdate.com/articles/the-great-texas-wind-
swindle-property-owners-vs-the-state-part-i/, archived at http://perma.cc/T39U-
2SY3 (describing landowner objections to transmission lines).  
 167. Westphal v. Ky. Utilities. Co., 343 S.W.2d 367 (Ky. 1961). 
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of the Company nor of the defendants are absolute, but 
each must be defined in terms of the rights of the other. Our 
ultimate criterion is therefore the reasonableness of use by 
each party.168  
In assessing reasonableness, the court looked to “present day 
conditions” both with respect to the utility’s use and the servient 
estate owner’s use. Making that assessment, the court concluded 
that:  
[T]he increased use of the automobile and the construction 
of an important highway adjacent to defendants’ property 
may be considered normal developments in our dynamic 
society which have made appropriate the proper and 
reasonable use of the surface for the passage of vehicular 
traffic. In order to utilize the surface for this change in use, 
defendants [landowners] find it necessary to level their 
property and thereby raise the surface of their land a 
relatively insignificant height. It is true they have invaded 7 
feet of air space which the Company claims the right to 
appropriate. However, assuming the rights of the parties do 
conflict (which is not clear in this record), we are of the 
opinion that defendants now have a better right to utilize 
this air space as appurtenant to a proper use of their land 
than plaintiff has to appropriate it exclusively as a cushion 
against a highly speculative hazard.169 
One way to reduce the need for court intervention is to provide 
for binding arbitration by neutral third parties where either party to 
the LIE seeks to change the use. A second method of reducing 
such conflicts is to limit the LIEs to a specific time period, 
reducing the chance that technological change will require altering 
the terms.  
Finally, utilities often claim the right to assign their rights 
under a LIE. For example, most utilities claim the right to transfer 
their easement rights to any other person or legal entity without the 
necessity of consent, permission, or even notice to the landowner. 
This leaves the landowner with no control over the identity of the 
entity with which the landowners is sharing the land. It is 
uncommon for landowners to lease land and allow the lessee an 
unlimited right to assign the lease without the landowner’s 
                                                                                                             
 168. Id. at 370. 
 169. Id. at 371. Analogously “  “, courts have held that oil and gas leases are 
made contemplating existing technology, and so “the lessee is responsible for 
damages to the land ruined by his use of new drilling methods.” 1A THOMPSON, 
supra note 8, §170 at 104.  
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approval. In particular, this raises the spectre that the utility might 
assign its rights to a judgment proof entity, leaving the landowner 
unprotected. A negotiated solution, which might provide 
landowners with an option to reject transfers under a financial 
responsibility standard, notice of proposed transfers, or other 
accommodations, would address such concerns. Where courts are 
overseeing LIE creations, they should have the power to add such 
terms. Restricting utilities’ eminent domain powers would also 
force the issue into negotiations. 
3. Termination 
Easements may be created as perpetual or for limited periods of 
time, including either a fixed period or “subject to conditions 
which provide for its termination upon the happening of certain 
contingencies.”170 When utilities use eminent domain to take 
perpetual easements, as they generally do, they are taking the 
maximum durational interest they can. Since the burden on the 
servient tenement increases with duration, a more appropriate 
duration may often be less than infinite. Particularly where 
technological and demographic change is likely to affect the future 
usefulness of an easement, an infinitely lived easement precludes 
the parties bargaining over how to adapt to new circumstances. 
Because courts are an inferior substitute (albeit one that is superior 
to no outside review at all) to arm’s length bargaining, encouraging 
the parties to negotiate is superior to having terms set by outsiders. 
In the case of lines designed to serve wind farms with a useful life 
of approximately 20 years, permanent easements seem particularly 
inappropriate and unlikely to be the result of arm’s length 
bargaining.  
Perpetual easements are particularly problematic in the LIE 
context because there are few remedies available to landowners 
seeking to end a dysfunctional relationship involving an easement. 
                                                                                                             
 170. II AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 71, § 8.87 at 298. See also 
4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 34.18 at 34-176 to 34-177 (“An easement can 
terminate either by expiring in accordance with the intent of the parties 
manifested in the creating transaction, or by being extinguished by the course of 
events subsequent to its creation. Termination by extinguishment includes a 
wide variety of methods, some resting primarily upon conduct of the dominant 
owner, as for example, release and abandonment; some resting primarily upon 
conduct of the servient owner, as for example, prescription and conveyance to a 
third person having no actual or constructive notice of the easement’s existence; 
some resting upon conduct in which both parties must participate, as for 
example, merger, and estoppel; and some resting upon the conduct of outside 
entities, as for example, mortgage foreclosures, eminent domain and tax sales.”). 
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The relationship created by an eminent domain LIE, whose terms 
are dictated by a utility, includes neither exit nor voice. Where 
there is a lack of responsiveness by an organization to exit and 
voice, Hirschman argues that “thought must be given both to 
making exit more easy and attractive by appropriately redesigned 
institutions and to making the organization more responsive to 
voice.”171 To do that in the utility LIE case requires giving servient 
estate owners both exit rights and a means of exercising voice 
during the easement’s existence. 
In general, easements may be terminated by action of the 
dominant owner (e.g., release and abandonment), through 
prescription, merger, estoppel, eminent domain, mortgage 
foreclosures, or tax sales.172 Crucially, there is no general method 
for the servient owner to escape the easement analogous to a 
cotenant’s ability to force a partition or sale. The only method by 
which servient estate owners have escaped easements in the courts is 
through the “liberal application of the estoppel doctrine.” As 
Powell’s treatise notes, this is an unusual application of the concept 
of estoppel: 
In most branches of the law an estoppel arises only through 
reliance upon a misrepresentation of a present or past factual 
situation. The persons estopped must have caused, in such a 
way that they are responsible for having done so, the persons 
claiming the benefit of an estoppel to believe something to 
be true that is not true. In the extinguishment of easements, 
however, the required basic misrepresentation is really as to 
the future, instead of as to the past or present. It consists in 
the creation of a reasonable believe that in the future the 
dominant owner intends not to make use of the servient 
tenement authorized by the easement. As phrased, this 
misrepresentation concerns a present intent as to future 
conduct. Thus verbally, this case is brought within the 
theoretical scope of estoppel, but such conformity is more 
verbal than real.173 
Given the extremely limited circumstances in which a court might 
be willing to stretch estoppel to fit such circumstances, there is 
effectively almost no remedy for the servient estate owner 
available at law. 
                                                                                                             
 171. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 6, at 123. 
 172. 4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 34.18 at 34-176 to 34-177.  
 173. Id. at § 34.22[2], 34-206 to 34-207. 
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III. SOLVING JOINT OWNERSHIP ISSUES IN LIES 
We propose five statutory reforms to eminent domain law by 
which states could address the problems identified with LIEs. The 
simplest is to end the eminent domain powers of utilities and 
require them to negotiate terms for easements with landowners. 
While we recognize there may be occasional hold out issues, the 
existence of multiple routes for most utility infrastructure suggests 
to us that this is unlikely to be a major problem for expanding and 
improving the United States’ energy and telecommunications 
infrastructure. Short of ending utility eminent domain powers, we 
suggest four other reforms designed to cope with the problems a 
unilateral power to control easement terms creates.  
A. Limit eminent domain powers of utilities 
The simplest solution to the problems described above is to 
remove the power of eminent domain from utilities for LIEs. 
Utilities argue that they need eminent domain power to avoid hold 
out problems.174 However, the successful record of utility 
acquisition of LIEs without the use of eminent domain suggests 
this is overstated. For example, the LCRA line, which crosses 
Kimble County, Texas en route from the Texas Panhandle to 
Austin, is the second such line to be constructed on that route.175 
The first was built roughly 20 miles to the east by Florida Power & 
                                                                                                             
 174. The grant of eminent domain powers to electric utilities traces in part to 
famed early twentieth century utility executive Samuel Insull, who  
[W]as one of the few business leaders to join Robert LaFollette and other 
progressive politicians to oppose municipal corruption, to advance 
“scientific” approaches for managing government and business, and to 
argue that electricity companies constituted natural monopolies that 
required public oversight. . . . Insull’s less vocalized motivation was a 
desire to deal with only one state agency rather than hundreds of city 
councils with whom his expanding empire was doing business. . . . 
Although criticized by many of his utility colleagues who wanted no 
government intervention, Insull became the chief proponent of regulation 
and monopoly. He understood that public oversight meant utilities would 
gain protection from competitors as well as the right of eminent domain, 
which previously was reserved for the state. 
MUNSON, supra note 10, at 55. The transformation of utilities from “a 
hodgepodge of competitive businesses into centralized utility monopolies” 
helped turn the industry into one dominated by “holding companies and power 
pools” which “demanded an increasingly sophisticated and costly transmission 
system” which required more investment in equipment during the 1920s than 
“the transcontinental railroads during the decade of their most rapid expansion.” 
Id. at 56–57. 
 175. See infra app. 5.  
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Light (FPL), which does not have the power of eminent domain in 
Texas.176 FPL reportedly paid much higher prices for its easements 
than LCRA (although the exact amounts are protected by contracts 
prohibiting the landowners from revealing what they were paid). In 
addition, FPL easements contain significantly different provisions 
from the LCRA easements. For example, FPL indemnified its 
servient estate owners.177 
There is some evidence that the process by which risks are 
imposed affects risk perception, which also suggests that eminent 
domain is particularly inappropriate for LIEs, as determining 
reasonable compensation is particularly difficult in such 
instances.178 As Dent and Sims conclude in their study of risk 
perception involved in wind energy and cell phone towers:  
Professionals working in the field of value impacts of 
facilities such as HVOTLs [high voltage overhead 
transmission lines], cell towers and wind turbines need to 
appreciate that those opposing any particular technologies, 
or specific sites, are not necessarily acting irrationally. Nor 
can their actions be categorized simply as NIMBYism (not 
in my back yard). . . . There are often more complex issues 
surrounding such opposition, such as power relations, 
democracy, personal histories, etc.179 
Most importantly, terminating utilities’ eminent domain 
powers would not end the creation of LIEs, but instead would 
require negotiations with landowners for easements. If particular 
features of LIEs led to landowners insisting on greater 
compensation, utilities would be incentivized to develop means of 
abating the problems. If negotiations resulted in higher costs for 
utilities, this would lead to more accurate social cost pricing of 
transmission—a feature, not a bug. Indeed, forcing utilities to pay 
the full cost of building transmission lines would create incentives 
to adopt innovative technologies and pricing formulas that could 
                                                                                                             
 176. See infra app. 4. 
 177. See id. 
 178. For example, some Japanese research has found that “a new social 
system involving active participation and ‘ownership’ within the decision-
making process can change the risk-benefit distribution balance and the role of 
all in the community through a more inclusive approach and greater 
transparency in risk communication.” Dent & Sims, Risk Perception, supra note 
145, at 34–35. This suggests that eminent domain is particularly inappropriate 
for such facilities. 
 179. Id. at 40.  
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reduce the need for additional transmission lines.180 As Munson 
notes generally:  
The fact that more efficient technologies are available or just 
on the horizon does not mean they will be adopted, or that 
continued technological development will be a priority of a 
restructured electricity industry. Whether power innovations 
are boosted depends a great deal on how policy barriers are 
removed and open markets are advanced.181 
Nonetheless, we recognize that utilities are politically powerful 
and unlikely to quietly yield a valuable power to redistribute rights 
in their favor.182 We therefore also suggest alternative means of 
making the eminent domain process more likely to yield improved 
LIEs. 
B. Empowering neutral decision makers to structure easements 
As discussed above, a key difference between LIEs and other 
easements is the absence of either arm’s length bargaining over the 
easement terms, or a neutral third party to craft the easement. 
Eminent domain proceedings in all states include neutral third 
parties to determine the price. For example, Texas law provides for 
an initial commissioners’ hearing using a panel of three area 
residents appointed by the local district judge, followed by appeal 
to the district court.183 A small change to most states’ statutes 
would be sufficient to enable these same neutral decisionmakers to 
have the power to alter the easement terms proposed by the utility 
for the LIE.184 Not only would this provide a useful check on 
                                                                                                             
 180. MUNSON, supra note 10, at 149 (noting potential for improved 
conductors that can carry more power than existing materials); Id. at 150 (noting 
potential for congestion charges to improve efficiency of networks). Innovation 
is a problem in electric utilities because as a group they spend relatively little on 
research and development, devoting just 0.03% of revenue to R&D. Id. at 152. 
See also NYE, supra note 15, at 159 (noting lack of investment in R&D and 
advanced transmission line technology). 
 181. MUNSON, supra note 10, at 152. 
 182. Utilities are aided by environmentalists’ “myopic focus on Renewable 
Portfolio Standards”, which helps create a ‘bootleggers and Baptists’ coalition in 
favor of expansion of transmission lines. Id. at 164; Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers 
and Baptists-The Education of a Regulatory Economist, REGULATION 12 
(May/June 1983). “Soft” energy gurus, Amory and Hunter Lovins, have long 
advocated for greater reliance on dispersed generation systems but the overall 
response has been greater centralization. NYE, supra note 15, at 132. 
 183. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.014 (2013). 
 184. Asking a neutral third party to make such decisions may require 
additional skills beyond valuation, but we think courts and the sorts of lay panels 
often asked to play a role in such disputes (as in Texas) are capable of 
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potential abuse of the eminent domain process, but it would also 
enable the eminent domain proceeding to better cope with hard-to-
value characteristics of easements, such as indemnification clauses. 
Moreover, this would likely induce more bargaining by utilities 
prior to the contest stage, as they would bargain in the shadow of 
the law.  
For example, the Texas eminent domain statute could be 
amended by adding a provision to Property Code § 21.042 that 
stated: “(h) In addition to awarding damages, the special 
commissioners may alter the terms of the easement proposed by 
the condemnor,” and amending the initial clause of Property Code 
§ 21.003 to provide: “A district court may determine all issues, 
including the authority to condemn property, the assessment of 
damages, and the terms of any easement or other interest 
condemned, in any suit . . .” 
Such small changes could provide an important substitute for 
the lack of arm’s length bargaining. 
C. Create exit rights 
Utilities should not be able to take perpetual easements. The 
useful life of the infrastructure installed on LIEs is predictable. If 
utilities are allowed to retain eminent domain rights, they should 
be limited to taking easements no longer than either the current 
industry standard for the useful life of the infrastructure to be 
installed, or twenty years, whichever is shorter.185 And, of course, 
the default rule should be that a utility would be obliged to remove 
any structures it had placed on the easement. While this is less than 
the unilateral right of exit allowed co-owners of property, it 
recognizes that infrastructure investments are lumpy and the 
utilities must be able to recover their fixed costs if they are to be 
viable. Of course, utilities and landowners should be free to 
negotiate for longer easements if they can reach an agreement on 
the term, but the power of eminent domain should be limited in 
recognition of the extraordinary burdens being forced into an 
involuntary relationship with a utility carry for the landowners. 
                                                                                                             
 
determining the terms of easements as well as the value of interests taken. The 
parties would be able to propose language to the decision maker(s) as well. 
 185. If the length of the easement depended on the utility’s declaration of the 
useful life of its equipment, we suspect the claimed useful life of equipment 
would improve dramatically. Thus, we suggest that a maximum life be included 
to prevent the utility from overinvesting in (or claiming) extending equipment’s 
life span to procure longer easements. 
2014] INVOLUNTARY COTENANTS 83 
 
 
 
D. Create better data on LIE costs and provisions 
One problem for landowners is that they compete on unequal 
ground with utilities seeking to create LIEs. The utilities have the 
benefit of knowing what they paid for easements elsewhere; the 
landowners have only the information their appraisers and 
attorneys are able to gather from public records and other sources. 
Utilities not only do not share this information with each other or 
landowners, but they do not always use it themselves. For 
example, a LCRA representative stated in a commissioners’ 
hearing involving Morriss’s in-laws that “there was no budget” for 
land acquisition for a transmission line it was constructing, 
implying the utility could spend as much as it wished. Developing 
a database of LIE terms and prices would enable appraisers to 
provide decision makers and the parties to eminent domain 
proceedings with better estimates of the impact of LIEs.  
If states are going to allow utilities to exercise eminent domain 
powers, they ought to seek to ensure that landowners receive a fair 
market price for the easements. Creating a statewide, publicly 
available database of LIE terms and prices would be a significant 
step in this direction and aid appraisers, fact finders, property 
owners, and utilities in properly costing out proposed LIEs.  
E. Establish standards to guide determination of value 
There are significant and complex issues involved in valuing 
the effect of a LIE on a property. One is how to assess the negative 
impact on a property’s remainder. A variety of methods have been 
used, including surveys and hedonic pricing studies based on 
actual sales.186 While hedonic pricing has significant advantages 
because it relies on revealed preference data, the optimal approach 
involves multiple methods to “triangulate” the real effect.187 
Effects can go beyond price issues as well. Some United States and 
United Kingdom studies showed reluctance by banks to lend for 
properties located near or under high voltage transmission lines;188 
there is a lack of studies on whether there are longer times to sale 
for properties near or burdened with LIEs.189 
                                                                                                             
 186. Dent & Sims, Introduction, supra note 145, at 5–6. 
 187. David Wyman, et al., Methods, in TOWERS, TURBINES AND 
TRANSMISSION LINES: IMPACTS ON PROPERTY VALUE 11, 21–22 (Sally Bond et 
al., eds. 2013).  
 188. Dent & Sims, Risk Perception, supra note 145, at 36–37. 
 189. David Wyman & Elaine Worzala, A Review of HVOTL Studies in North 
America, in TOWERS, TURBINES AND TRANSMISSION LINES: IMPACTS ON PROPERTY 
VALUE 101, 111 (Sally Bond et al., eds. 2013). 
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Another such issue is the impact of public perception of the 
health impacts or other dangers of the LIE. There is a large and 
contested literature on most LIE uses, from cell phone 
infrastructure to power lines.190 Whether these dangers actually 
exist is irrelevant, however, if they have an impact on the market 
price of the burdened land.191 
Current practice leaves these decisions to be resolved on a 
case-by-case basis. Developing a framework for compensable 
impacts and guidelines could be done by state public utility 
commissions through the regulatory process or by other bodies, 
including legislatures. Of course, these are open to regulatory 
capture by utilities, but most states have law firms that regularly 
represent landowners in eminent domain and negotiations over 
LIEs, so there would be a repeat player counterweight to utilities.  
CONCLUSION 
Over time, the size, scope, and number of LIEs are likely to 
expand significantly to meet the demand for incorporating 
renewable energy and unconventional sources of fossil fuels into 
the United States’ national energy networks, as well as to meet the 
demand for greater telecommunications bandwidth. In addition, 
hardening networks against natural disasters and terrorists require 
network expansions that will require LIEs. If we do not wish to 
disproportionately burden those landowners on whose properties 
the LIEs will be located, we need to improve the process by which 
LIEs are created. 
The most important reform is to push more LIEs into 
negotiations. The unilateral creation of LIEs on all dimensions 
other than compensation is problematic in many ways. Since LIEs 
rarely involve exit rights, non-negotiated LIEs place landowners 
into an often adversarial relationship with a new co-owner of their 
land. Absent negotiation, giving courts and other bodies the power 
to set easement terms during contested LIE creations would at least 
                                                                                                             
 190. SANDY BOND ET AL., TOWERS, TURBINES AND TRANSMISSION LINES 
(Sally Bond, Sally Sims, & Peter Dent, eds. 2013); MUNSON, supra note 10, at 
176 (“Proposals for high-voltage wires often provoke heated reactions from 
homeowners worried about falling property values and illnesses caused by 
electromagnetism.”). 
 191. Peter Dent & Sally Sims, Risk Perception, Stigma, and Behavior, in 
TOWERS, TURBINES AND TRANSMISSION LINES: IMPACTS ON PROPERTY VALUE 
27, 37 (Sally Bond et al., eds. 2013) (“If factors such as health, aesthetics and 
nuisance are considered to cause property stigma in specific cases, and these 
factors are considered to have an impact on the value of the property, then this 
needs to be incorporated into a valuer’s toolkit and quantified.”). 
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partially address these problems. Other steps, as outlined above, 
that better inform landowners, courts, and other decision makers 
about the impacts of LIEs and the prices set in both voluntary and 
involuntary LIE creations would also improve the eminent domain 
process. 
APPENDIX 1-TYPICAL INDEMNIFICATION LANGUAGE USED IN 
ARM’S LENGTH AGREEMENTS 
Grantee hereby agrees to defend, indemnify and hold grantor 
and its agents, successors and assigns harmless from and against, 
and to reimburse, grantor and its agents, successors and assigns 
with respect to any and all liabilities, claims, demands, damages, 
expenses or causes of action of whatever nature, specifically 
including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs 
of suit paid or incurred by Grantor, its agents, successors and 
assigns, asserted by others and related, directly or indirectly, to 
Grantee’s use of the easement property, construction or operation 
of the pipeline; breach of this agreement, and/or that are caused by 
or arise in any manner out of acts or omissions of Grantee, its 
agents, employees, representatives or any other person under 
Grantee’s control or acting at Grantee’s direction. The terms of this 
indemnity provision as it applies to environmental matters shall 
survive the termination or expiration of the easements. 
APPENDIX 2-TYPICAL INDEMNIFICATION LANGUAGE USED IN 
ARM’S LENGTH AGREEMENTS  
Abandonment. If Grantee discontinues to use the Transmission 
Facilities for a period greater than one (1) uninterrupted year, after 
receiving a written request from Grantor, Grantee shall remove all 
of the Transmission Facilities on the Land and restore the Land to 
its approximate original condition that existed before Grantee 
constructed its Transmission Facilities all at Grantee’s sole cost 
and expense. Such removal by Grantee shall be accomplished 
within one (1) year after receiving a written request from Grantor 
and include any Transmission Facilities to a depth of one (1) foot 
beneath the surface of the Land.  
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APPENDIX 3 - ONCOR EASEMENT (TAKEN WITH EMINENT 
DOMAIN) 
EASEMENT AND RIGHT OF WAY 
STATE OF TEXAS     § 
§ KNOW ALL MEN 
BY THESE PRESENTS: 
COUNTY OF LAMPASAS    § 
 
That, EVAN GEORGE EVANS and BONNIE KIM EVANS, 
HUSBAND AND WIFE, hereinafter called “Grantors”, whether 
one or more, for and in consideration of Ten and no/100 Dollars 
($10.00) and other valuable consideration to Grantor In hand paid 
by Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC, a Delaware limited 
Liability company, 1601 Bryan St., Dallas, Texas 76201, 
hereinafter referred to as “Grantee”, has granted, sold and 
conveyed and by these presents does grant, sell and convey unto 
said Grantee, its successors and assigns, an easement and right-of-
way for one double circuit electric transmission power line 
consisting of a variable number of wires and cables, including 
communication wires to be used solely In connection with the 
transmission of electricity, together with all necessary or desirable 
appurtenances Including supporting structures, foundations, guy 
wires and guy anchorages (the “Facilities”) over, under, across and 
upon all that certain tracts) of land located in Lampasas County, 
Texas, more particularly described in Exhibits A and B, attached 
hereto and made part hereof. 
Together with: (1) the right of Ingress and egress over and 
along the easement and right-of-way and over Grantor’s adjacent 
lands to or from the easement and right-of-way, for the purpose of 
and with the right to construct, operate, improve, reconstruct, 
replace, repair, inspect, patrol, maintain and add or remove such 
electric power and communications lines or other Facilities as the 
Grantee may from time to time find necessary, convenient or 
desirable to erect thereon during the initial construction of the 
Facilities or at any time thereafter; (2) the right to Install gates In 
all existing and future fences crossing the easement and right-of-
way, provided such gates will be Installed in a manner that will not 
weaken such fences; (3) the right to relocate its facilities along the 
same general direction of said lines; (4) the right to trim and cut 
down trees and shrubbery on the easement and right-of-way, 
including by use of herbicides or other similar chemicals approved 
by the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, to the extent, In the 
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sole judgment of the Grantee, necessary to prevent possible 
interference with the operation of said lines or to remove possible 
hazard thereto; and (5) the right to remove at Grantor’s expense or 
to prevent the construction on the easement and right-of-way of 
any or all buildings, structures and obstructions. 
Grantor shell not make or cause any changes In grade, 
elevation, or contour of the land (except those activities, excluding 
terracing, associated with normal agricultural activities) within the 
easement and right-of-way described herein without first providing 
advance notice and obtaining prior written consent to do so from 
Grantee. If written consent Is not obtained prior to any action by 
Grantor that causes any changes In grade, elevation, or contour of 
the land within the easement and right-of-way, Grantor shall, upon 
demand from Grantee, at Grantor’s expanse, restore the easement 
and right-of-way to Its previously existing condition, or reimburse 
Grantee fully for the cost of adjusting its Facilities as necessary to 
accommodate the change In grade, elevation, or contour of the land 
within the easement and right-of-way In the event Grantor falls to 
promptly restore the grade, elevation, or contour to its previously 
existing condition.  
Grantor shall not perform any excavations, trenching, or other 
soil disturbing activities (except those activities, excluding 
terracing, associated with normal agricultural activities) that, in the 
sole judgment of Grantee, will endanger the integrity of the 
supporting structures and/or foundations or other Facilities, as 
applicable, or perform any other activities that may, in the sole 
judgment of Grantee, remove, reduce, or adversely affect or Impact 
the lateral support of the supporting structures and/or foundations 
or other Facilities, as applicable, without first providing advance 
notice and obtaining prior written consent to do so from Grantee. If 
prior written consent Is not obtained by Grantor prior to 
performing any excavation, trenching or other soil disturbing 
activity that endangers the integrity of the supporting structures or 
foundations or other Facilities, as applicable, Grantor shall, upon 
demand from Grantee, at Grantor’s expense, restore the easement 
and right-of-way to Its previously existing condition, or reimburse 
Grantee fully for the cost of adjusting its Facilities as necessary to 
accommodate the excavation, trenching, or soil disturbing activity 
in the event Grantor falls to promptly restore the easement and 
right-of way to Us previously existing condition or cannot do so.  
Grantor reserves the right to use the easement and right of way 
area provided such use shall not Include the growing of trees 
thereon or any other use that might, in the sole judgment of the 
Grantee, interfere with the exercise by the Grantee of the rights 
hereby granted. Grantor further reserves the right to lay out, 
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dedicate, construct, maintain and use across said strip such roads, 
streets, alleys, railroad tracks, underground telephone cables and 
conduits and gas, water and sewer pipelines as will not interfere 
with Grantee’s use of said land for the purpose aforesaid, provided 
ail such facilities shall be located at angles of not less than 46 
degrees to any of Grantee’s (Ines, and shall be so constructed as to 
provide with respect to Grantee’s Facilities the minimum 
clearances provided by law and recognized as standard in the 
electrical Industry, as same may change from time to time. Grantor 
also reserves the right to erect fences not more than 8 feet high 
across said land, provided all such fences shall have gates, 
openings, or removable sections at least 16 feet wide which will 
permit Grantee reasonable access to all parts of said land. Should 
Grantee later determine that a width greater than 16 feet is 
necessary, then Grantee shall have the right granted above to 
Install additional or wider gates at Its sole discretion, but the 
installation of such additional or wider gates shall be at the sola 
expense of Grantee.  
Grantor retains all right, title, and interest in and to all oil, gas, 
and other minerals (whether by law classified as part of the mineral 
estate or the surface estate) and groundwater In, on, and under the 
strip or land described herein; provided, however, that Grantor 
shall not be permitted to drill for oil, gas, and other minerals, and 
groundwater from and under said strip of land but Grantor may 
extract oil, gas, and other minerals, and groundwater from and 
under said strip of land by directional drilling, mining, or other 
means, so long as Grantee’s use of said strip is not disturbed, 
which use shall include the right of Grantee to physical and/or 
lateral support for the Facilities, as well as the right that the 
Facilities shall not be endangered, obstructed, or Interfered with by 
such operations. In addition to the consideration above recited for 
the easement and right-of-way hereby granted, the Grantee will 
pay to the owner of the land, and, if leased, to his tenant, as they 
may be respectively entitled for actual damages to fences and 
growing crops and Improvements located on the easement and 
right-of-way caused by reason of the construction, maintenance, 
addition or removal of said lines; provided, however, that no such 
payment will be made for trimming or removal of trees growing on 
the easement and right-of-way, nor for removal of buildings, 
structures, or obstructions erected upon the easement and right-of-
way after granting of this easement and right-of-way. 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above described easement and 
right-of-way unto the said Grantee, Its successors and assigns, until 
all of said lines end other Facilities shall be abandoned, and In that 
event said easement and right-of-way shall cease and all rights 
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herein granted shall terminate and revert to Grantor or Grantor’s 
heirs, successors or assigns; and Grantor hereby binds Grantor and 
Grantor’s heirs, successors, assigns, and legal representatives, to 
warrant and forever defend the above described easement and 
right-of-way unto Grantee, its successors and assigns, against 
every person whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same 
or any part thereof. This easement may be assigned in whole or in 
part. 
APPENDIX 4-FPL EASEMENT (NEGOTIATED WITHOUT EMINENT 
DOMAIN) 
TRANSMISSION EASEMENT 
THIS TRANSMISSION EASEMENT (“Agreement”) is made 
and entered into this 31st day of March, 2009 by and among Stacy 
Loth, as her sole and separate property, as to an undivided 50% 
Interest, and Stephanie A. Iglor, as her sole and separate property, 
as to an undivided 50% Interest (collectively, the “Grantor”), and 
Horse Hollow Generation Tic, LLC, a Delaware limited liability 
company (“Grantee”), who arc sometimes individually referred to 
as a “Party” and collectively as the “Parties”. 
RECITALS 
A. Grantor is the owner of a certain tract of real property 
located in Kimble County, Texas and more particularly described 
on Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof (“Land”); and  
B. Grantor desires to grant and convey to Grantee an exclusive 
easement for the erection, installation and maintenance of certain 
facilities for the transmission of electric power over and across a 
certain portion of the Land. 
IN CONSIDERATION of the foregoing and other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are 
hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
(1.) Transmission Easement. Grantor grants to Grantee an 
irrevocable, exclusive easement for the construction, installation, 
maintenance, use, operation, repair, replacement, relocation and 
removal of Transmission Facilities and Telecommunication 
Facilities on, over, across, along and under the Land or such 
portions thereof that may be described in the attached Exhibit A 
and depicted in the attached Exhibit B (“Transmission and 
Telecommunication Easement”). “Transmission Facilities” shall 
mean all improvements whose purpose is to deliver electrical 
power to an electrical power grid or other system, Including 
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without limitation transformers and overhead and underground 
electrical transmission lines, and interconnection facilities. 
“Telecommunication Facilities” shall mean all improvements whose 
purpose is to provide telecommunication services, including 
telephone, closed-circuit television, microwave, internet, computer 
data and other telecommunication services related to the operation of 
the Transmission Facilities. Grantor shall also grant to Grantee the 
right to investigate, inspect, survey, and conduct tests on the Land 
relating to the Transmission and Telecommunication Easement, 
including, but not limited to, environmental, archeological and 
geotechnical tests and studies. This easement is limited to one 
hundred twenty-five (125) feet in width, There shall be no more than 
one 345 KV electric line and reasonably necessary accessories 
structures for said 345 KV line. The poles utilized shall be single 
spun concrete poles. 
(2.) Access Easement. Grantor grants to Grantee an 
irrevocable, non-exclusive easement for vehicular and pedestrian 
ingress and egress over, across and along the Land or such portions 
thereof that may be described in the attached Exhibit A (“Access 
Easement”) by means of any existing roads or lanes thereon, or 
otherwise by such route or routes as Grantee or Grantor may 
construct from time to time. If Grantee needs to construct a road on 
the Land, it shall coordinate the location of the road with Grantor. 
Grantee agrees to maintain and repair all roadway improvements 
located on the Access Easement for the joint use thereof by 
Grantor and Grantee for ingress and egress over, across, and along 
the Access Easement; provided, however, Grantor shall reimburse 
Grantee for any costs and expenses incurred by Grantee to repair 
any damage or perform any special maintenance of the roadway 
caused by any person using the roadway with Grantor’s 
permission.  
(3.) Construction Easement and Guy Easement. Grantor hereby 
grants to Grantee, for the benefit of Grantee and its successors and 
assigns, a temporary easement on, over, along and under that 
portion of the Land located within the four hundred thirty foot 
(430*) area as measured from the point of intersection of the center 
line of the Transmission and Telecommunication Facilities as 
depicted on the attached Exhibit C (“Construction Easement”) (1) 
to construct and install guy stub(s), anchors and necessary guy 
wires (collectively “Guy Facilities”) to support the Transmission 
Facilities and Telecommunication Facilities to be constructed on 
the Transmission and Telecommunication Easement adjacent to the 
Construction Easement; (2) to store material and equipment during 
construction of the Guy Facilities and during construction of the 
Transmission Facilities and Telecommunication Facilities; and (3) to 
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construct and install the Transmission Facilities and 
Telecommunication Facilities to be constructed on the Transmission 
and Telecommunication Easement adjacent to the Construction 
Easement. The Construction Easement shall terminate upon 
completion of construction of the Guy Facilities and the Transmission 
Facilities and Telecommunication Facilities constructed on the 
Transmission and Telecommunication Easement adjacent to the 
Construction Basement. Grantor hereby grants to Grantee, for the 
benefit of Grantee and its successors and assigns, a permanent, 
exclusive easement on, over, along and under the Land located within 
the one hundred and sixty-five foot (165’) area as measured from the 
point of intersection of the center line of the Transmission and 
Telecommunication Facilities as depicted on the attached Exhibit C 
(“Guy Easement”) to maintain, use, operate, repair, replace, 
relocate and remove the Guy Facilities. 
(4.) Ownership. Grantor is the holder of fee simple title to all of 
the Land, and has the right, without the joinder of any other party, 
to enter into this Agreement and grant Grantee lite Easements. As 
used herein, the Transmission and Telecommunication Easement 
and Access Easement shall collectively be referred to as 
“Easements”. Grantor agrees to warrant and defend its ownership 
of the Land and Grantee’s interest in this Agreement against any 
other party claiming to have any ownership interest in the Land. 
(5.) Relocation of Facilities. The exact locations and routes of 
the Easements may not be determined until the completion of 
Grantee’s inspection, testing, study and surveying of the Land and 
the locations and routes of such Basements as shown on the 
attached Exhibit B may be relocated or rerouted by Grantee, after 
obtaining written consent from Grantor, at any time during the 
term of this Agreement, so long as the nature and extent of any 
such relocated or rerouted Easements arc not materially different 
and impose no greater burden on the Land than the original 
locations or routes, and so long as Grantee takes appropriate 
actions to minimize any disruption or inconvenience to Grantor 
and the uses of the Land reserved to Grantor; PROVIDED, 
HOWEVER, once the 345 KV line has been constructed, Grantee 
shall have no further right to change the location of the easement 
without the prior written consent of Grantor, Grantee shall provide 
Grantor an “as built” survey of any such relocated or rerouted 
Easements after receiving a written request from Grantor. 
(6.) Uses Reserved by Grantor. Grantor expressly reserves the 
right to use the Land for all other purposes not granted to Grantee 
under this Agreement, including oil and gas exploration and 
production, ranching and agricultural uses, hunting and other 
recreational uses that do not interfere in any way with Grantee’s 
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use of the Land under this Agreement, and including the joint use 
of the roadways now or hereafter located on the Access Easement, 
subject to the following conditions, requirements and limitations:  
(i.) Oil and Gas Exploration and Production. Grantor agrees to 
provide Grantee with current information concerning the status and 
location of all oil and gas exploration and production activities on 
the Land. Any new oil and gas leases or renewals of existing oil 
and gas leases entered into by Grantor must include a surface use 
agreement that will prevent the oil and gas exploration and 
production activities from interfering with Grantee’s use of the 
Land.  
(ii.) Ranching and Agricultural Uses. Grantor and Grantee 
agree to cooperate with each other in a manner that will allow 
Grantor to continue the current ranching and agricultural uses of 
the Land in a manner that does not unreasonably interfere with 
Grantee’s use of the Land. 
* There is included a temporary easement as shown on Exhibit C 
until installation of the 345 KV line has been completed and used 
in a commercial manner. 
(iii.) Hunting and Other Recreational Uses. Grantor and 
Grantee agree to cooperate with each other in a manner that will 
allow Grantor to use the Land for hunting and other recreational 
purposes in a manner that does not unreasonably interfere with 
Grantee’s use of the Land or impact the safety of its employees or 
contractors, provided however, during hunting season, Grantee will 
not enter the Land without providing Grantor or Grantor’s attorney 
notice, as provided in Section 13 of (his Agreement, of their 
intentions to enter the Land. 
(7.) No Interference. Grantor covenants and agrees that neither 
Grantor nor its agents, lessees, invitees, guests, licensees, 
successors or assigns will (i) interfere with, impair or prohibit the 
free and complete use and enjoyment by Grantee of its rights 
granted by this Agreement; (ii) take any action which will in any 
way interfere with or impair the transmission of electric, 
electromagnetic or other forms of energy to or from the Land; or 
(iii) take any action which will interfere with or impair Grantee’s 
access to the Land for the purposes specified in this Agreement. 
Grantee shall have the right, without compensation to Grantor, to 
cut, prune and remove or otherwise dispose of any foliage or 
vegetation on or near the Land that Grantee deems a threat or 
potential threat to the Transmission Facilities or its rights 
hereunder. 
(8.) Right to Mortgage. Grantee may, upon notice to Grantor, 
but without Grantor’s consent or approval, mortgage, collaterally 
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assign, or otherwise encumber and grant security interests in all or 
any part of its interest in the Land. These various security interests 
in all or a part of the Land are collectively referred to as a 
“Mortgage” and each holder of the Mortgage, is referred to as 
“Mortgagee.” Any such Mortgagee shall use the Land only for the 
uses permitted under this Agreement. Whenever Grantee has 
mortgaged an interest under this Section, it will give notice of the 
Mortgage (including the address of the Mortgagee for notice 
purposes) to Grantor; provided that failure to give this notice shall 
not constitute a default under this Agreement, but rather shall only 
have the effect of not binding Grantor with respect to such 
Mortgage until notice is given. As a precondition to exercising any 
rights or remedies related to any alleged default by Grantee under 
this Agreement, Grantor shall give written notice of the default to 
each Mortgagee at the same time it delivers notice of default to 
Grantee, specifying in detail the alleged event of default and the 
required remedy. To the extent permitted by the Mortgage at issue, 
any Mortgagee shall be permitted to exercise or perform any and 
all of Grantee’s rights and obligations hereunder and Grantor shall 
accept such exercise and performance thereby. Any Mortgagee 
under any Mortgage shall be entitled to assign its interest or 
enforce its rights thereunder, as permitted by applicable law, 
without notice to or approval of Grantor. 
(9.) Assignment and Sublease. Grantee shall have the right, 
without Grantor’s consent, to sell, convey, lease, or assign all or 
any portion of its interest in the Land, on either an exclusive or a 
non-exclusive basis, or to grant subleases, subcasements, co-
easements, separate leases, easements, licenses or similar rights 
with respect to the Land (collectively, “Assignment”), to one or 
more persons or entities (collectively “Assignee”). Any such 
Assignee shall use the Land only for the uses permitted under this 
Agreement. When Grantee has assigned its interests under this 
Section, or has conveyed a sublease, subeasement or other interest, 
Grantee shall give notice of the assignment or conveyance 
(including the address of the Assignee for notice purposes) to 
Grantor; provided the failure to give such notice shall not 
constitute a default under this Agreement, but rather shall only 
have the effect of not binding Grantor with respect to such 
assignment or conveyance until such notice is given. Any such 
assignment by Grantee of its interests in this Agreement shall 
release Grantee from all obligations accruing after the date that 
liability for such obligations is assumed by the Assignee. 
(10.) Hazardous Materials. Grantor represents and warrants 
that, to the best of Grantor’s knowledge, the Land is not and has 
not been in violation of any federal, state or local environmental 
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health or safety laws, statute, ordinance, rule, regulation or 
requirement (“Environmental Laws”), and Grantor has not received 
any notice or other communication from any governmental authorities 
alleging that the Land is in violation of any Environmental Laws. 
“Hazardous Materials” shall mean any asbestos containing materials, 
petroleum, explosives, toxic materials, or substances regulated as 
hazardous wastes, hazardous materials, hazardous substances, or toxic 
substances under any federal, state, or local law or regulation. Grantor 
represents and warrants that, except as disclosed to Grantee in 
writing, to the best of Grantor’s knowledge, no underground storage 
tanks and no Hazardous Materials are or were located on the Land 
during or prior to Grantor’s ownership of the Land. Grantor shall 
not violate in a material way any Environmental Law relating to 
the Land. 
(11.) Indemnity by Grantee. Grantee shall defend, indemnify, 
protect and hold Grantor harmless from and against all liabilities, 
costs, expenses, obligations, losses, damages, claims, (collectively 
“Liability”) resulting from the negligence, willful misconduct, or 
breach of this Agreement by Grantee, its agents, contractors or 
employees, invitees, licensees and permittees; provided, however, 
that such Liability is not due to any negligence, willful misconduct, 
or breach by Grantor, its agents, contractors or employees, 
invitees, licensees or permittees. 
(12.) Removal. If Grantee discontinues to use the Transmission 
Facilities for a period greater than one (1) uninterrupted year, after 
receiving a written request from Grantor, Grantee shall remove all 
of Transmission Facilities on the Land and restore the Land to its 
approximate original condition that existed before Grantee 
constructed its Transmission Facilities all at Grantee’s sole cost 
and expense. Such removal by Grantee shall be accomplished 
within one (1) year after receiving a written request from Grantor 
and include any Transmission Facilities to a depth of one (1) foot 
beneath the surface of the Land. 
(13.) Notice. All notices given or permitted to be given 
hereunder shall be in writing. Notice is considered given either (i) 
when delivered in person to the recipient named below, (ii) upon 
receipt after deposit in the United States mail in a sealed envelope 
or container, postage and postal charges prepaid, return receipt 
requested or certified mail, addressed by name and address to the 
party or person intended, or (iii) twenty-four (24) hours from 
proper and timely delivery to on overnight courier service 
addressed by name and address to the party or person intended as 
follows: 
2014] INVOLUNTARY COTENANTS 95 
 
 
 
Notice to Grantor: [Grantor’s name and address] 
 
Notice to Grantee: [Grantee’s name and address] 
 
Either party may, by notice given at any time or from time to 
time, require subsequent notices to be given to another individual 
person, whether a party or an officer or representative, or to a 
different address, or both. Notices given before actual receipt or 
notice of change shall not be invalidated by the change 
(14.) Severability. If any term or provision of this Agreement, 
or the application thereof to any person or circumstance shall, to 
any extent, be determined by judicial order or decision to be 
invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of this Agreement or the 
application of such term or provision to persons or circumstances 
other than those as to which it is held to be invalid, shall be 
enforced to the fullest extent permitted by law. 
(15.) Governing Law. Except as otherwise provided herein, this 
Agreement be [sic] governed by the applicable laws of the State of 
Texas, and the County where the Land is located shall be 
considered the proper forum or jurisdiction for any disputes arising 
in connection with this Agreement. 
(16.) Successors and Assigns. The terms and provisions of this 
Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of 
the heirs, successors, assigns and personal representatives of the 
Parties. 
(17.) Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in 
multiple counterparts, each of which shall be deemed the original, 
and all of which together shall constitute a single instrument. 
(18.) Easement Area Restoration. Within ninety (90) days after 
installation of the 345 KV electric line has been completed and 
electricity in commercial quantities is being transmitted, the 
Grantee, without contribution from Grantor, will clean the 
easement area, and as much as practical, restore the land to the 
condition in which it was found before said installation, including 
the removal of all rocks having a diameter of greater than twelve 
inches (12”) which Grantee has unearthed. 
(19.) Title Commitment Requirement. This Agreement is 
executed in good faith by the Grantor as the holder of one hundred 
percent (100%) of the ownership interests of the Land. Grantor and 
Grantee agree that this Agreement is contingent upon (i) receipt by 
Grantee of a title commitment from Stewart Title Guaranty 
Company or other national title insurance company authorized to 
do business in Texas and (ii) compliance with and completion of 
all requirements of any such title company, as set forth on 
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“Schedule C” of such title commitment, which act to clarify record 
ownership of the Land and allow the title company to issue a title 
policy based upon such title commitment. In the event the title 
commitment and other supporting documents list vested ownership 
interest in the Land in people or entities other than the people and 
entities collectively named as “Grantor” in this Agreement and 
signatories hereto, upon which Grantee has relied in entering into 
this Agreement, this Agreement shall be null and void. Grantor and 
Grantee also agree that the division of ownership percentages or 
interests, if any, indicated in the title commitment shall be 
determinative for the purposes of compensation paid by Grantee 
under the separate Compensation agreement to this Agreement, 
unless the Grantee is otherwise unanimously directed by all 
applicable Grantor individuals and entities. Notwithstanding 
anything to the contrary herein, in the event the ownership 
percentages or interests as determined by a title commitment differ 
from that stated in the separate Compensation agreement, but the 
people or entities named as having an ownership interest in the title 
commitment is the same as the people and entities collectively 
named as “Grantor” herein, this Agreement shall be in full force 
and effect and the Parties agree to enter into an amendment to the 
separate Compensation agreement to this Agreement to reflect 
proper payment allocation. In the event that there are parties or 
entities listed in the title commitment as having an ownership 
interest in the Land (including fee simple, remainder and life estate 
interests) not a party to this Agreement, then this Agreement shall 
be null and void, provided, however, ail entities and individuals 
currently identified as a Grantor in this Agreement shall diligently 
cooperate with Grantee to execute a similar new agreement with all 
entities and individuals having an ownership interest in the Land 
properly included. Grantor shall diligently cooperate with all 
requirements that a title company may set forth (in a “Schedule C” 
to a title commitment, or reasonably otherwise) in order to 
determine, clarify and/or correct the record title to the Land. 
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APPENDIX 5 - LCRA EASEMENT (TAKEN WITH EMINENT DOMAIN) 
ELECTRIC LINE EASEMENT AND RIGHT-OF-WAY 
EASEMENT PROPERTY: Two tracts of land consisting of 
approximately 14.35 acres and 16.88 acres, both of which are in 
Kimble County, Texas, being more particularly described on the 
plat and field notes attached hereto as Exhibit A and Exhibit B, 
which exhibits are incorporated herein for all purposes. 
ACCESS EASEMENT: A tract of land consisting of 
approximately 1.13 acres in Kimble County, Texas, being more 
particularly described on the plat and field notes attached hereto as 
Exhibit C, which exhibit is incorporated herein for all purposes. 
PROJECT: Electric transmission line or lines not to exceed a 
nominal voltage of 345 kV, consisting of a variable number and 
sizes of wires and circuits, and all necessary or desirable 
appurtenances (including insulators and above ground supporting 
structures made of wood, metal, or other materials). The Project 
may also include communication lines and appurtenances used 
solely in connection with electric system operations.  
GRANTOR, for the CONSIDERATION paid to GRANTOR, 
hereby grants, sells, and conveys to GRANTEE an easement and 
right-of-way in, over, across, under, upon, though, and above the 
EASEMENT PROPERTY and in, over, across, and upon the 
ACCESS EASEMENT, together with all and singular the rights and 
appurtenances thereto in anywise belonging, to have and hold it to 
GRANTEE and GRANTEE’S successors and assigns forever. The 
easement, right-of-way, rights, and privileges herein granted over the 
EASEMENT PROPERTY shall be used for the purposes of locating, 
constructing, placing, operating, maintaining, reconstructing, 
replacing, rebuilding, upgrading, removing, inspecting, patrolling, 
repairing, protecting, or altering the PROJECT, or any part of the 
PROJECT, and making connections therewith. 
GRANTEE shall have the right of ingress and egress at all 
times upon and across the EASEMENT PROPERTY for the above 
stated purposes and upon and across the ACCESS EASEMENT to 
and from the EASEMENT PROPERTY to provide vehicular and 
pedestrian access to and from the EASEMENT PROPERTY for 
GRANTEE and its agents or contractors. GRANTEE shall have 
the right to construct and maintain a right-of-way on the ACCESS 
EASEMENT suitable for such access, but GRANTEE shall not be 
responsible for the condition, repair, or maintenance of such right-
of-way, except that GRANTEE shall repair any actual damage 
done to such right-of-way by GRANTEE or any of its agents or 
contractors or any actual damage done to any existing roads of 
98 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. 3 
 
 
 
GRANTOR located within the ACCESS EASEMENT. GRANTEE 
shall have the right to install and maintain appropriate gates along and 
in any fence, as necessary or appropriate for the exercise of 
GRANTEE’S right of ingress and egress on the EASEMENT 
PROPERTY and ACCESS EASEMENT. 
GRANTEE shall have the right to place poles, towers, guys or 
other ground-based support structures permanently on the 
EASEMENT PROPERTY. GRANTEE shall have the right to place 
new or additional wire or wires within the EASEMENT PROPERTY 
and to change the sizes and transmission voltages thereof not to 
exceed nominal 345 kV. GRANTEE shall have the right to locate, 
relocate, or reconstruct the PROJECT within the EASEMENT 
PROPERTY. GRANTEE shall have the right to trim, chemically 
treat, and/or remove from the EASEMENT PROPERTY and 
ACCESS EASEMENT all trees, shrubs, and parts thereof, and the 
right to remove any structure, building, object, equipment, or 
obstruction within the EASEMENT PROPERTY and ACCESS 
EASEMENT. GRANTEE shall limit chemical treatment of 
vegetation to spot application to treat stumps resulting from removal 
of trees and to keep undergrowth clear from gates, fences, and 
transmission line support structures and appurtenances. GRANTEE 
shall follow all applicable local, state, and federal laws, ordinances, 
rules, and regulations in the application and use of chemicals on the 
EASEMENT PROPERTY and ACCESS EASEMENT. 
GRANTOR shall not place or construct any structure in or on the 
EASEMENT PROPERTY or ACCESS EASEMENT. GRANTOR 
may not plant any trees or shrubs on the EASEMENT PROPERTY 
or ACCESS EASEMENT, nor retain or impound surface waters 
within the EASEMENT PROPERTY or ACCESS EASEMENT, nor 
change the grade of the EASEMENT PROPERTY or ACCESS 
EASEMENT without the prior written approval of GRANTEE. 
GRANTOR shall not place or operate any temporary or permanent 
equipment or object within the EASEMENT PROPERTY without 
fully complying with all applicable laws and regulations. GRANTEE 
shall have the right to place temporary poles, guys, and supporting 
structures on the EASEMENT PROPERTY for use in erecting, 
maintaining, or repairing the PROJECT. 
GRANTOR reserves the right to use and enjoy the surface of the 
EASEMENT PROPERTY for all purposes, including the right to 
cultivate and grow crops; to cultivate gardens, grass, and landscaping; 
to pasture livestock on the EASEMENT PROPERTY; to build fences 
across; to temporarily park cars, trucks, and equipment on the 
EASEMENT PROPERTY, and to place across the EASEMENT 
PROPERTY, or on or along the length thereof, roads, streets, 
driveways, and sidewalks, so long as such use or uses do not 
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interfere with or interrupt the exercise of the easement rights 
granted to GRANTEE herein. 
GRANTEE agrees that upon completion of construction of the 
PROJECT, GRANTEE shall remove and dispose of all debris, trash, 
and litter resulting from construction on the EASEMENT 
PROPERTY and ACCESS EASEMENT and shall restore the surface 
of the EASEMENT PROPERTY, as nearly as reasonably practicable, 
to the condition in which the EASEMENT PROPERTY was found 
immediately before construction was begun; however, GRANTOR 
understands and agrees that vegetation cleared from the EASEMENT 
PROPERTY will not be replaced, and areas modified by GRANTEE 
for access or erosion control will not be restored to their prior 
condition.  
It is understood and agreed that the CONSIDERATION herein 
paid includes payment for all physical damages for the initial 
construction and ordinary operation and maintenance of the 
PROJECT, but does not include payment for physical damages, if 
any, to GRANTOR’S remainder property, which may occur in the 
future after the original construction of the PROJECT, directly 
resulting from the reconstruction or repair of the PROJECT. 
GRANTEE shall not be liable for damages caused by keeping the 
EASEMENT PROPERTY and ACCESS EASEMENT clear of trees, 
undergrowth, brush, structures, and obstructions. All parts of the 
PROJECT installed on the EASEMENT PROPERTY shall remain 
the exclusive property of GRANTEE. 
GRANTOR expressly reserves all oil, gas, and other minerals 
owned by GRANTOR, in, on, and under the EASEMENT 
PROPERTY and ACCESS EASEMENT, provided that GRANTOR 
shall not be permitted to drill or excavate for minerals on the surface 
of the EASEMENT PROPERTY or ACCESS EASEMENT, but 
GRANTOR may extract oil, gas, or other minerals from and under 
the EASEMENT PROPERTY or ACCESS EASEMENT by 
directional drilling or other means which do not interfere with or 
disturb GRANTEE’S use of the EASEMENT PROPERTY or 
ACCESS EASEMENT. 
The rights granted to GRANTEE in this Easement and Right-of-
Way are assignable in whole or in part. This instrument, and the terms 
and conditions contained herein, shall inure to the benefit of and be 
binding upon GRANTEE and GRANTOR, and their respective heirs, 
personal representatives, successors, and assigns. GRANTOR 
warrants and shall forever defend the Easement and Right-of-Way to 
GRANTEE against anyone lawfully claiming or to claim the 
EASEMENT PROPERTY or ACCESS EASEMENT or any part 
thereof, subject to the following: 
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(i.) visible and apparent easements not appearing of record ; 
(ii.) any discrepancies, conflicts, or shortages in area or 
boundary lines or any encroachments or any overlapping of 
improvements which a current survey would show; 
and, 
(iii.) easements, restrictions, reservations, covenants, oil and 
gas leases, mineral severances, and encumbrances for taxes and 
assessments (other than liens and conveyances) presently of record 
in the Official Public Records of Kimble County, but only to the 
extent that said items are valid and in force at this time. 
When the context requires, singular nouns and pronouns 
include the plural. When appropriate, the term “GRANTEE” 
includes the employees and authorized agents of GRANTEE. This 
instrument may be executed in duplicate originals, and each 
counterpart shall be deemed an original and all such counterparts 
together shall constitute one and the same instrument.  
